Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-1-1982

Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of
Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers
Vanessa Merton
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons

Recommended Citation
Vanessa Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists
and Lawyers, 31 Emory L.J. 263 (1982), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/163/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE "DANGEROUS"
PATIENT: IMPLICATIONS OF TARASOFF FOR
PSYCHIATRISTS AND LAWYERS
by

Vanessa Merton*

You may find lawyers defining the range of treatments that
you are allowed to use in specified circumstances. Lawyers
may prescribe the criteria by which you are to choose among
the allowable treatments. Lawyers may specify the priorities
you must assign to different patients. Lawyers may require
you to keep detailed records to establish at all times that you
are in full compliance. Lawyers may punish you unless you
can refute beyond a reasonable doubt their presumption that
your failures result from not following all of their regulations
and requirements.
The lawyers have you outnumbered, but on the average
they are no match for you in intelligence or dedication. Just
don't let them ambush you while you are absorbed in caring
for the sick.**

A. Lawyers and Doctors: The Guerrilla War Goes On
The rancor and contempt felt by most physicians for that stock
villain "the lawyer" has become a standard theme in the sociology
of the professions. The epigraph above may be a gem of its kind
* Clinical Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Senior Adjunct A~sociate,The Hastings Center. A.B.,'RadclifTe College, 1971; J.D., New York University School of Law, 1973.
Much of the research for this article was done under the auspices of the National Endowment for the Humanities, through its sponsorship of the Postdoctoral Fellowship Program
at the Hastings Center Institute of Society, Ethics and Life Sciences. The Center is a superlative setting for research of this sort, not so much because of its (relatively modest) resources, but because of the extraordinary people who are associated with it. Jonas Robitscher was one of the original Fellows of the Hastings Center and until his death was a
regular and valued participant in its work. The loss of his support and friendship is keenly
CENTERREPORT14 (June 1981).
felt by a l l at the Center. See 11 HASTINGS
** Commencement Address by Chancellor W. Allen Wallis, University of Rochester
School of Medicine and Dentistry, quoted in Schwartz, Will Medicine Be Strangled in the
Law? N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 35, col. 2.
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and perhaps atypically vehement, but the intensity of feeling it
captures is not exaggerated. The atmosphere encountered by lawyers who venture into the health-care setting in a professional capacity is much like that in a village controlled by indigenous forces
when the government troops drop by.'
For a lawyer to ask why such antipathy exists would be disingenuous; the reasons are legion, many of them valid, some no doubt
misinformed. Lawyers may be able to refute them, but to what
end? We are dealing not, or not solely, with the sort of cognitive
A number of lawyers over the past decade have participated in the health-care system
in a different way and for different reasons than ever before. Neither hospital counsel nor
health-care administrators, not adversarial or representative in the usual sense, these lawyers do not engage in institutional management, patient protection, or staff defense. Instead, their role is advisory, educational, and supportive; their objective is to work with
health-care providers as members of the health-care team. As is true of the "ethicists" who
also have become integral to the operation of several hospitals, see Kahn, Philosophers
Prime Physicians for Ethical Dilemmas, HOSPITALS,Sept. 16, 1982, at 162; Lippert, The
Medical Philosophers, 14 HWTH12 (1982); Hospitals Turning to Philosophers for Advice
on Life-and-Death Decisions, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1982, at Al, col. 3, this new breed of
hospital based lawyer has been brought into the institution initially via the academic superstructure found in most major medical centers. While these lawyers do a good bit of teaching and lecturing, they also go on rounds, sit in on "morning report," participate in mortality and morbidity conferences, join institutional review boards, and consult with troubled
health-care providers on individual cases. Their mission is not to "define
prescribe.
specify. . require. .and punish," as Chancellor Wallis put it, but rather to enable healthcare providers to deliver the beet services possible. Their professional responsibility is first
to the health-care personnel with whom they work, and ultimately to the patients for whose
benefit all work. They are, in Geoffrey Hazard's classic phrase, "lawyers for the situation."
ETHICSIN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW58 (1978).
See G. HAZARD,
Very gradually, despite considerable resistance, these lawyers seems to be making inroads
on the physician's stereotyped image of the mercenary attorney. Clinicians are discovering
that these lawyers, who themselves often have had clients, can understand what it is to
struggle with difficult decisions under constraint of limited time and resources and inadequate information. Some genuine progress towards acknowledging the problems and values
common to both professions has been made. It is thii kind of exchange and shared experience which might eventually alter the attitudes of health-care professionals toward lawyers
and the law.
Not to be unduly optimistic: most of this has been happening on "soft money"-special
grants from government agencies or private foundations. These funds are evaporating and it
is not at all clear that as a class these programs have generated sufficient enthusiasm to
insure their survival. A few may survive, with correspondingly minimal impact on the
deeply-rooted distrust of lawyers still epidemic in the medical sphere. The typical encounter
of lawyer and physician, other than as patient or as client, is likely to remain a bristling
bout of barely suppressed hostility and suspicion in which each takes more or less disguised
delight in surpassing the other's jargon.

.
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belief that is subject to modification by skillful persuasion and better evidence. We are dealing with what both street parlance and
social science would deem an "attitude," a view of the world which
has crystallized from an amalgam of experience, psychological
need, and plausible folklore. One indication of this is that physicians' ire seems to focus in personal terms on lawyers, rather than
on the abstract obduracy of our complex legal system and its tedious processes.

.

As every lawyer who has ever tried a case to a jury should know
even without benefit of the technical literature on attitude format i ~ nchanging
,~
someone's attitude requires more than verbal facility and sound argument. An article such as this one, in the highly
unlikely event that it is read by a practicing clinician, cannot be
expected to greatly affect that clinician's attitude toward lawyers.
(The clinician who reads this piece probably would be an unusually
benign specimen to begin with). What an article like this can try to
do is trace the connection between a particular recent development
of the law, one which most clinicians consider stupid and unfair,
and their own previous actions. The point is not to avoid blame
but to help clinicians appreciate just how much control they can
exercise over their legal destinies through the medium of professional self-regulation.
This essay examines the role conflict of the professional whose
patient or client may be "dangerous" to others, and the ways in
which professional standards of ethics and practice, incorporated
by judicial ruling, contribute to that role conflict. The paper's focus is on the plight of the psychiatrist: but it also addresses the
strain felt by the lawyer who either represents such a client or is
asked to advise a psychiatrist who has such a patient. It suggests
that health-care providers are not altogether justified in assigning

' See, e.g., Zibardo, The Tactics and Ethics of Persuasion, in AT~ITWES,
CONFLICT
AND SOCIAL
CHANGE81 (1972).
a Jonas Robitscher correctly maintained that the word "psychiatrist" often should be
read to denote an m a y of practitioners-not only physicians, clinical psychologists, and
psychoanalysts, but also the "social workers, registered nurses, counselors, pastoral counselors, ex-addicts and ex-alcoholics and other indigenous workers, and a large category we term
'mental health technicians' who in some settings
enjoy psychiatric authority and
make psychiatric decisions!' J. ROBITSCHER,
THEPOWERS
OF PSYCHIATRY
8 (1980).

...
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sole responsibility for some of their professional difficulties to the
law's incursions on clinical autonomy. Contrary to the assertions of
Chancellor Wallis, the criteria by which the law evaluates the conduct of medical professionals continue almost exclusively to be defined by the self-set standards of customary and prudent practice,
and that state of affairs is unlikely to change.' For so long as it

' See generally A. HOLDER,MEDICALMALPRACTICE
LAW(2d ed. 1978); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OP THE LAWOF TORTS
§ 32 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS,
§
299A (1965); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 597 (later case service 1979 & Supp. 1982) (overwhelming
weight of authority supports view that expert evidence to support malpractice action is essential). Despite the protests of those who find anomalous the medical profession's ability to
define unilaterally its legal and ethical responsibilities, see, e.g., R. VEATCH,A THEORY
OF
MEDICAL
ETHICS82-107 (1981), very few courts have imposed an "objective," nonprofessionally defined, standard of care on physicians, and then only with regard to the nontechnical
issue of informed consent. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1064 (1972) (physician must disclose all risks a reasonable person would consider,
as opposed to what other physicians would consider, significant). But see Note on the AfterCASESAND MATERImath of Canterbury in the District of Columbia, in LAWAND MEDICINE:
ALS 202-03 (D. Sharpe, S. Fiscina, & M. Head eds. 1978) (explaining why Canterbury may
not be good law even in the District of Columbia). See also Truman v. Thomas, 27 Cal. 3d
285,611 P.2d 902,165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980) (physicians have a duty to advise patients of all
material risks of refusal to undergo recommended diagnostic tests; material risks are those
that physicians know or should know would be regarded by a reasonably prudent person as
significant) (relying on Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229,502 P.2d 1,104 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1972));
Sard v. Hardy, 34 Md. App. 217, 367 A.2d 525 (1976) (physician's duty to disclose may be
determined by nonprofessional standard if trial court decides specific facts of case justify
failure to present expert opinion); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684 (Minn. 1977) (physician can be held liable for failure to disclose risks according to jury standard, without
reference to established custom of medical community); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super.
260,286 A.2d 647 (1971) (standard of practice in informed consent cases distinguished from
that of normal malpractice suit, in which issue is whether physician failed to conform to
accepted medical practice); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972) (evidence
of professional standards on disclosure of relevant risks not required to maintain action);
Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973 & Supp. 1982) (traditional view in effect in most jurisdictions still is that duty is measured by professional medical standard: either custom of local
community of physicians or what a reasonable physician would do under similar circumstances). For an exhaustive state-by-state analysis of the legislative response to judicial innovation in the area of informed consent, see generally Meisel & Kabruck, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent Legislation, 41 U. P I . L. REV. 407
(1980).
The cases most often cited for the proposition that standards of practice are gradually
becoming defined by legal rather than by expert medical standards are Washington decisions. See Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash.-2d 246,595 P.2d 919 (1979) (compliance with standard
of profession of opthalmology insufficient to defeat claim of malpractice for failure to conduct additional simple, inexpensive, risk-free, diagnostic tests when initial test inconclusive). Accord Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (same holding when
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obtains, lawyers will be tempted to respond to complaints about
unjust or unworkable standards with "Physician, heal thyself." Of
course, the argument that clinicians can control their exposure to
legal liability through concerted professional action is not meant to
imply that their moral dilemmas can be as easily resolved. For
most practitioners those questions undoubtedly are far more
troubling.

B. Psychiatrists and Lawyers: A More Subliminal Conflict
Of all health-care providers, psychiatrists traditionally have been
the least intolerant of lawyers. Despite the utter opposition of their
philosophies-the rigid determinism of psychoanalytic theory, behavioral science, and psychopharmacology matched by the idealistic insistence on "free will" of the law-psychiatrists and lawyers
seem to have enjoyed an uneasy detente akin more to sibling rivalry than to guerrilla war. For one reason, psychiatrists have been
the object of relatively few malpractice actions (it is harder to
prove negligent failure to resolve an adjustment reaction to adult
life than careless reduction of a fractured leg) other than as the
indemnified and defended representatives of mental health institut i o n ~ Too,
. ~ lawyers and psychiatrists share a peculiar problem:
along with their reputedly high social status and income, both receive considerable public ridicule and o b l ~ q u y Perhaps
.~
because

'

claim for failure to perform any diagnostic procedure because not indicated by professional
standards). But see Meeks v. Marx, 15 Wash. App. 571, 550 P.2d 1158 (1976) (restricting
Helling to its unique facts); WASH.REV.CODE8 4.24.290 (Supp. 1975) (legislative nullification of the Helling +e). For a critical analysis of these decisions and for argument that
"the law's tradition of allowing the medical profession to set its own standards of care must
be scrupulously upheld except when those standards are patently unreasonable," see Peters,
The Application of Reasonable Prudence to Medical Malpractice Litigation: The Precursor
of Strict Liability? 9 L. MED. & HWTHCARE21, 24 (Dec. 1981).
See Fishalow, The Tort Liability of the Psychiatrist, 4 BULL.AM. ACAD.PSYCHIATRY
& L. 191, 191 (1976), and authorities cited therein at 217 n.5.
The shamanistic " s h r i i and the shyster "mouthpiece" both are derided for the arbitrariness and absurdities of their doctrines. Lawyers seem almost to take a perverse deTHECONlight in recounting examples of the abuse heaped on them. See D. MELLINKOPP,
SCIENCE OF A LAWYER
1-15 (1973) for a particularly thorough collection, ranging from Jesus'
"Woe unto you also, ye lawyers!" through Shakespeare's: "The first thing we do, let's kill all
the lawyers," to the proverb about St. Ives: "Advocatus et non latro; Res miranda populo"
(translated by Mellinkoff as "A lawyer and not a thief; A thing almost beyond belief").
Mellinkoff sums up public opinion of lawyers as follows: "Sure the law is the third oldest
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the accelerating application of forensic psychiatry in every aspect
of civil and criminal practice has resulted in more frequent and
more sustained professional contact between lawyers and psychiatrists, however, the mutual misunderstanding characteristic of relationships between lawyers and the generic class of health-care
providers seems increasingly to prevail between lawyers and
psychiatrists.
No wonder we sorely miss Jonas Robitscher. As a master of both
professions who succeeded in melding their respective insights into
an integrated perspective, Dr. Robitscher was well equipped to
identify the excesses of each. His intolerance for rigid ideology of
profession all right, in close order after whoring and pimping." Id. a t 1. Lawyers may take
some consolation in the fact that it was Adolph Hitler who said: "Every lawyer must be
regarded as a man deficient by nature or else deformed by usage." Willig, The Bar in the
Third Reich. 20 A.J. LEGALHIST. 1. 1 (1976).
.
For an example of community attitudes toward psychotherapy, see the extensive account
in R. SLOVENKO
& G. USDIN,PSYCHOTHERAPY,
CONP~DENTIALITY
AND PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATION 44-46 (1966), discussing an illustrative comment by Vladimir Nabokov:
Our grandsons will no doubt regard today's psychoanalysis with the same amused
contempt as we do astrology and phrenology. I cannot conceive how anybody in
his right mind should go to a psychoanalyst, but of course if one's mind is deranged one might try anything: after all, quacks and cranks, shamans and holy
men, kings and hypnotists have cured people.
Id. a t 45.
In part such attitudes may be explained by the fact that lawyers and psychiatrist3 generally are called upon to intervene in circumstances of intense conflict, internal or interpersonal. These interventions often directly affect persons other than the client or patient in
ways that the ministrations of other professionals do qot. Regardless of the conflict's outcome, the psychic distress it engenders will linger. Psychologists tell us that distress can
foster the need to attribute blame to someone else-a means of feeling able to control and
avert further distress. Of those involved in the conflict, the professional, who after all ie
making a living from it, is the easiest to blame. Lawyer and psychiatrist thus may acquire a
kind of guilt by association. See Chaikin & Darley, Victim or Perpetrator: Defensive Attribution of Responsibility and the Need for Order and Justice, 25 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY
268 (1973) (people need to attribute blame for misfortune to something other
than chance in order to feel in control). Fritz Heider's work on the external and internal
determinants of perceptions of causation remains the basic model for social psychological
THEPSYCHOLOGY
OF INTERPERanalyses of the attribution of responsibility. See F. HEIDER,
SONAL RELATIONS
79, 112-24,167-74.212-14, 246-51, 255-65 (1958). Heider points out that a
person may be "held responsible for each effect that is in any way connected with him or
seems in any way to belong to him" -guilt by association. Id. a t 113. For an interesting
interpolation of the Heiderian model with theories of legal liability, see Hamilton, Who is
Responsible? Toward A Social Psychology of Responsibility Attribution, 41 Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 316 (1978).
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any stripe, together with his critical eye, led him to diagnose the
occasional lunacy of the law and the apparent anomie of psychiatry
with equal candor and accuracy. Thoroughly skeptical of the
Guttmacher-Weihofen model of a "psychiatrized" legal system in
which judges and penal authorities would rely on the scientific assessment of "impartial" experts, Dr. Robitscher was likewise unpersuaded by the Szaszian claim that just about any utilization of
psychiatric expertise in legal decision-making is inherently corrupt
At the same time he appreciated the partial truths
and collu~ive.~
of both positions, which he incorporated into his own more complex prescriptions.
Jonas Robitscher saw no reason to conclude that law and psychiatry, either as intellectual disciplines or as practical professions,
are inherently incompatible. The title of his first book reflects his
longstanding commitment to forging their rapproachement. His lucid exposition of the sources and consequences of the friction between the two professions, I n Pursuit of Agreement: Psychiatry
and the Law, still stands as the exemplar of what has become an
impressive body of literature.$ Only Dr. Robitscher's last work,
The Powers of Psychiatry, surpasses it. In both books, Dr. Robitscher reviewed the contexts in which the interaction of psychiatrists and lawyers has been more problematic than productive, and
suggested several reasons: the a t times slavish adherence of lawyers
to absolutist logic and outdated precedent; the annoyingly mutable
See J. ROBITSCHER,
THEPOWERSOF PSYCHIATRY
52, 113 (1980). See also M.
GUITMACHER
& H. WEIHOFEN,
PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW10-11 (1952); Szasz, Psychiatric
Expert Testimony: Its Overt Meaning and Social Function, 20 PSYCHIATRY
313 (1957).
a See, e.g., S.J. BRAKEL
& R.S. ROCK,THE MENTALLY
DISABLED
AND THE LAW(rev. ed.
1971); W. BROMBERG,
THEUSESOF PSYCHIATRY
IN THE LAW:A CLINICAL
VIEWOF FORENSIC
LAW,PSYCHIATRY
AND THE MENTAL
HEALTH
SYSTEM(1974);
PSYCHIATRY
(1979); A. BROOKS,
& P.S. APPLEBAUM,
CLINICAL
HANDBOOK
OF PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW(1982);
T.G. GUTHEIL
M.GUITMACHER,
THEROLEOF PSYCHIATRY
IN LAW(1968); S.HALLECK,
LAWIN THE PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY:
A HANDBOOK
FOR CLINICIANS
(1980); H. HUCKABEE,
LAWYERS,
PSYCHIATRISTS
AND CRIMINAL
LAW:COOPERATION
OR CHAOS?
(1981); J. KATZ,J. GOLDSTEIN,
& A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS,
PSYCHIATRY
AND LAW(1967); LAWAND ETHICS
IN THE PRACTICE
OF
PSYCHIATRY
(C.K. Hofling ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as LAW& ETHICS];J.W. POLIER,
THE
RULEOF LAWAND THE ROLEOF PSYCHIATRY
(1968); PSYCH~ATRISTS
AND THE LEGAL
PROCESS:
DIAGNOSIS
AND DEBATE
(R. Bonnie ed. 1977); R. SLOVENKO,
LAWAND PSYCHIATRY
(1973); A.
STONE,MENTAL
HEALTHAND LAW:A SYSTEMIN TRANS~TION(1975); D. WEXLER,MENTAL
HEALTH
LAW:MAJORISSUES
(1981).
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nosology and inflated scientism of psychiatrists; and, most importantly, the failure of both lawyers and psychiatrists to approach
one another's work with open minds, respect, and the will to
understand.

A. Uncertainty and Ambivalence in Professional Work
Like members of the other "helping professions," lawyers and
psychiatrists elicit ambivalent responses from those they try to
help. Resentment, mistrust, and envy often mingle with whatever
gratitude is felt by recipients of professional service and care.e
The ambivalence of patients and clients is mirrored in the contradictory impulses experienced by professionals when the needs of
an individual patient or client clash with the interests of society or
loyalof another individual. Under a variety of titles-"divided
ties," "double agent," "conflict of interest,"-this problem has assumed a central role in the study of professional ethics. Like the
related issue of the inherent limitations of professional ability,1° it
For two of the early sociological accounts of this phenomenon, see Goffman, The
Medical Model and Mental Hospitalization: Some Notes on the Vicissitudes of the Tinkering Trades in ASYLUMS321, 345-47, 358-59 (1961); Merton & Barber, Sociological AmbivaAMBIVALENCE
AND OTHER
ESSAYS
3 (R.K. Merton ed. 1976).
lence, reprinted in SOCIOLOGICAL
See also Toulmin, The Meaning of Professionalism: Doctors' Ethics and Biomedical Science in KNOWLEDGE,
VALUEAND BELIEF254,259-61 (H.T. Engelhardt, Jr. & D. Callahan eds.
1977) (despite the title, Professor Toulmin devotes substantial portions of his analysis to the
legal profession). Finally, see Merton, Merton, & Barber, Client Ambivalence in Professional Relationships: The Problem of Seeking Help from Strangers, in 2 NEWDIRECTIONS
IN HELPING
(B.M. DePaulo, A. Nadler, & J.D. Fisher eds. in press).
lo Because of the (not necessarily conscious) belief that they need, as much as technical
prowess, the power to inspire clients and patients with trust in the practitioner and faith in
the practice, professionals are tempted to minimize factors that might undermine that faith
and trust. The line between appropriate reassurance and deceptive advertising is not always
easy to negotiate. It is axiomatic, but hard to admit (either to oneself or to the patient or
client) that the adroitly conducted cross-examination may not discredit the witness, that the
perfectly executed surgery may not save the patient. Ironically, the quack or hack often will
offer guaranteed results. The probabilistic nature of professional practice has been thorR. FEINoughly investigated only with respect to medicine, see generally H. BURSZTAJN,
BLOOM, R. HAMM,
& A. BRODSKY,
MEDICAL
CHOICES,
MEDICAL
CHANCES:
HOWPATIENTS,
FAMILIES AND PHYSICIANS
CANCOPEWITHUNCERTAINTY
(1981); A. ELSTEIN,L.S. SHULMAN,
&
S.A. SPRMKA,
MEDICAL
PROBLEM
SOLVING:
AN ANALYSIS
OF CLINICAL
REASONING
(1978), but
the uncertainty principle clearly obtains in other professions as well. For the first systematic
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is a difficult problem for most professionals to face.

It seems reasonable to suggest, as many critics of the professions
have, that in the course of gaining informed consent to treatment
or representation, professionals ought to discuss topics such as the
limits of their expertise and the potential for divided loyalties. An
honest interchange in which the client's or patient's own unconscious or unspoken fears are voiced could diffuse those fears. While
it is not easy, and not invariably appropriate, to explain to an anxious patient or client that one's very best may fail and that one's
loyalty is subject to compromise, continuing denial of these critical
aspects of the professional role can only exacerbate the problem.
Paradoxically, open admission of the potential for failure and betrayal may allow a deeper trust to develop in the professional
relationship."
sociological account of the impact of uncertainty in medical practice, see T. PARSONS,
THE
SOCIAL
SYSTEM466-69 (1951). See also C. BOSK,FORGIVE
AND REMEMBER:
MANAGING
MEDICAL FAILURE
(1979); R. Fox & J. SWAZEY,
THECOURAGE
TO FAIL
(1974); ARROW,Uncertainty
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.REV.941 (1963); Davis, Uncertainty in Medical Prognosis, Clinical and Functional, 66 AM. J. Soc. 41 (1960); Fox, Training for Uncertainty, in THESTUDENT-PHYSICIAN
207-41 (R.K. Merton, G. Reader, & P.C.
Kendall eds. 1957). The best recent treatment of the perceived need to assert control over
sources of uncertainty in professional practice is Light, Uncertainty and Control in Professional Training, 20 J. HEALTH& SOC.BEHAV.310 (1979).
Conscientious professionals increasingly find i t liberating to divest themselves of their airs
of authority and to require clients and patients to acknowledge the uncertainty inherent in
the professional encounter, despite the difficulties such a policy can cause. The classic work
on the difficulty of making important decisions under conditions of uncertainty is JUDGMENT
UNDERUNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS
AND BIASES(D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, & A. Tversky eds.
1982). In coping with the inevitable uncertainties, however, both the patient or client and
the professional still need the comforting sensation of being in the presence of power. The
trick is to forge a therapeutic alliance, a fiduciary compact that can create that sense of
power and, in a positive version of the self-fulfilling prophecy, enable the work to proceed
without the false support of an illusion of certitude.
" See Brody, The Patient's Role in Clinical Decision-Making, 93 ANNALSINTERNAL
MED.718 (1980); Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO.L.J. 1015,
1045-46 (1981); Katz, Disclosure and Consent in Psychiatric Practice: Mission Impossible?
in LAW& ETHICS,supra note 8, a t 91, 102-03, 115. See a k o D. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER
AND
CLIENT:WHO'S IN CHARGE38-61, 168-70 (2d ed. 1977) ("participatory" model of professional-client relationship, involving client's access to complete information, initial definition
of goals, periodic evaluation of professional's performance, and continuing communication
with professional may result in more effective collaboration and more genuine client-professional relationship); Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO. WASH.L.
REV., 307, 313-18 (1980) (full disclosure to client has positive utilitarian consequences as
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B. Patient Welfare and Society's Protection: The Role Conflict
of Psychiatrists
Jonas Robitscher was among the first to describe the divided
loyalties of psychiatrists and the need to protect patients from becoming victims of the varied pressures on their doctor^.'^ Chilling
reports of abuses in Soviet psychiatrylS have led other knowledgeable commentators to become concerned with this problem.
One such observer is David Bazelon, the jurist who presided over
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals during the decades of its innovative jurisprudence in the field of forensic psychiatry and mentalhealth policy." Now Senior Circuit Judge, Bazelon continues an
unremitting campaign not only against the "perils of wizardry"16
-undue reliance on technical expertise, psychiatric and otherwise
well as moral implications). But see Ackerman, Why Doctors Should Intervene, 12 HASTINGS CENTERREPORT14 (Aug. 1982) (god of restoring patient autonomy ill-served by
mechanical application of legalistic rules such as truthtelling); Moore & Tumin, Some Social
Functions of Ignorance, 14 AM. SOC.REV. 787 (1949) (client trust in unvarying professional
competence and certainty of favorable outcome necessary for effective relationship).
l a See J. ROBITSCHER,
INPURSUIT
OF AGREEMENT:
PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW203-21
(1966).
la For a description of Soviet psychiatrists' use of diagnostic labels such as "reformist
delusion" and "litigation mania" to "deprive [political dissidents] of freedom for an unlimited length of time, keep them isolated and drugged, and discredit their ideas and actions,"
& S. GLUZMAN,
A MANUAL
ON PSYCHIATRY
FOR DISSIDENTS
1,7-8 (1974). See
see V. BUKOVSKY
PSYCHIATRIC
TERROR:
HOWSOVIETPSYCHIATRY
18 USED
generally S. BLOCH& P. REDDAWAY,
TO SUPPRESS
DISSENT(1977). A letter from dissident psychiatrist Anatoly Koryagin, which
was smuggled out of the Soviet Union, indicates that world reaction to accounts of these
practices has not deterred their continuation. Koryagin's disclosures and protests bought
him twelve years of imprisonment and exile. See Letter from A. Koryagin, Appeal to Psychiatrists, 1981 LANCET1121 (Nov. 14,1981). Koryagin was elected an honorary member of
the American Psychiatric Association.
l4 See generally I n re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("beyond reasonable doubt"
standard of proof of mental illness and dangerousness imposed in involuntary civil commitment proceedings); United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Durham test
rejected in favor of A.L.I. "substantial capacity" test for insanity defense); Washington v.
United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (expert witnesses' use of technical psychiatric
terms limited and explanatory instructions regarding role of psychiatric witnesses required);
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (involuntary mental patient's constitutional right to treatment upheld); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (inquiry
into least restrictive alternative course of treatment for mental patient required); Durham v.
United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (new test of criminal responsibility adopted
under which accused is not responsible if act is produced by mental disease or defect).
l6 Bazelon, The Perils of Wizardry, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1317 (1974).
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-but also against the enlistment of psychiatrists into "service to
the political and social status quo."ls Echoing that theme, a major
conference, "In the Service of the State: The Psychiatrist as
Double Agent," was cosponsored in 1977 by the American Psychiatric Association and the Hastings Center.17 Dr. Seymour Halleck,
a forensic psychiatrist and author of a handbook for clinicians on
law and mental health, also has explored the ethical implications
of the psychiatrist's role of "double agent."18 Dr. Alfred Freedman,
chairman of the department of psychiatry a t New York Medical
College and past president of the American Psychiatric Association, made the divided allegiance of psychiatrists the subject of his
address to the plenary session of the First World Congress of Psychiatry. (The Congress later adopted the Declaration of Hawaii, international psychiatry's code of ethics.lS) The Chief of the Center
for Studies of Crime and Delinquency a t the National Institute of
Mental Health, Dr. Saleem Shah, has repeatedly decried the practice of confusing therapeutic objectives with obligations of social
control.20
1. In and Out of the Institutional Setting

Those who have expressed concern about the divided loyalties of
psychiatrists intimate that clarification and differentiation of the
psychiatrist's professional role is most urgently required in institutional settings such as hospitals, prisons, schools, and the armed
services. The patient's ability to withdraw from the psychiatrist's
care, which can serve to check potential abuse, is limited within
Bazelon, The Law, The Psychiatrist and The Patient, 5 MAN& MEDICINE
77, 78
(1980).
l7 See In the Service of the State; The Psychiatrist As Double Agent, 8 HASTINGS
CENTER
REPORT
(Special Supp. 1978). See also Callahan & Gaylin, The Psychiatrist As
Double Agent, 4 HASTINGS
CENTER
REPORT
12 (1974).
See Halleck, Privacy and Social Control in THE POLITICS
OF THERAPY
119 (1971).
See Freedman, Ethics in Psychiatry: A Question of Allegiance. 8 PSYCHIATRIC
ANNUS 5,14 (1978). See also WORLD
PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION,
DECLARATION
OF HAWAII
(19771,
reprinted in DICTIONARY
OF MEDICAL
ETHICS
138-40 (A.S. Duncan, G.R. Dunstan, & R.B.
Welbourn eds., rev. & enlarged ed. 1981).
See Shah, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Conceptual, Prediction and
BEHAVIOR:
A PROBLEM
IN LAWAND MENTAL HEALTH
(C.
Policy Dilemmas, in DANGEROUS
Frederick ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Shah, Dangerousness]; Shah, Foreword to A.
STONE,
MENTAL
HEALTH
AND LAW:A SYSTEM
IN TRANSITION
at x (1975).
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such institutions, and the independence of the psychiatrist's
clinical judgment is likely to be compromised by a sense of responsibility to institutional goals and priorities. Ties to other professionals and ambitions for advancement in the institutional hierachy also may have significant effects.
Concern about the pressure on psychiatrists who practice in institutions is well founded. To some extent, that concern is shared
by institutional administrators. In many psychiatric hospitals,
elaborate structural arrangements have been devised to separate
responsibility for clinical administration and ward management
from responsibility for the therapeutic regimen. The therapist who
works on the patient's inner conflicts does not decide whether to
give the patient a day's pass or how to respond to the patient's
"acting out" on the ward.21 But measures intended to insulate the
therapeutic mission of institutions from their purpose of social
control and societal protection can never wholly resolve the role
conflict of psychiatrists. Patients associated with institutions constitute only a fraction of those whose behavior psychiatrists are expected to -control. Psychiatrists in private
routinely are
called upon, and choose, to function as agents of social order and
family authority, despite the protests of their patients. In the process of trying to carry out this mandate, some psychiatrists may
experience what Bateson et al. describe as a "double bind": a situation in which no matter what one does, one "can't win" and will
feel that one has failed to satisfy a legitimate ~ b l i g a t i o n . ~ ~
See, e.g., R.L. COSER,TRAINING
IN AMBIGUITY: LEARNING
THROUGH
DOINGIN
MENTAL
HOSPITAL
35-61 (1979).

A

%' See Bateson, Jackson, Haley, & Weakland, Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia, reTO AN ECOLOGY
OF MIND201 (G. Bateson ed. 1972). It is important to note
printed in STEPS
that many psychiatrists claim to feel no such conflict, or consider it an extremely rare occurrence. To them, the responsibility of assuring that their patients do not harm themselves or
others seems entirely commensurate with their primary professional function of helping and
healing-indeed, it is identical to that function. (Whiie to therapists this may seem an obvious point, I am indebted to Dr. Willard Gaylin, psychiatrist and President of the Hastings
Center, for clarifying it for me.) The position of these psychiatrists is unabashedly paternalistic; that is, they will act in what they judge to be the best interests of their patients, even
when those actions are completely contrary to their patients' express wishes. In hospitalizing, medicating, or revealing the confidence of a patient who is disruptive on the job, problematic for family, or dangerous to the public, such psychiatrists see themselves as advancing, not compromising, the patient's interest. Lawyers frequently are -confused by this
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2. An Example: The Tarasoff Problem

A prime example of conflict between loyalty to a patient and responsibility to others is the Tarasoff problem, so called after the
controversial and unprecedented decision of the Supreme Court of
California in the case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
C a l i f ~ r n i aIn
. ~that
~ decision the court recognized a limited duty
on the part of psychotherapists to protect third parties from patients whom they consider "dangerous," if necessary by violating
that fundamental tenet of the profession's ethic, the promise of
confidentiality. All psychiatrists, indeed all psychotherapists of
whatever persuasion, regardless of institutional affiliation or its absence, are charged with this duty. Although Tarasoff arose in the
context of an institution, there is no reason to anticipate that the
court's holding will be confined to such situations. Subsequent
cases involving both private and institutionally based therapists
have not even alluded to the issue of institutional affiliation.
Tarasoff and its progeny provide substantial grounds for the thesis
that the professional role conflict of psychiatrists is not generated
solely by the pressures of practice in institutions.
The Tarasoffdecision galvanized the psychiatric profession into
efforts to educate courts and legislatures about the limits of psychiatrists' capacity to assure public safety, but these disclaimers
have had little effect on the spread of the Tarasoff doctrine to
other jurisdictions. Psychiatrists condemn the doctrine as yet anrationale and tend to view the psychiatrist who acts in accord with it not as paternalistic
but as actively preferring, to the detriment of the patient, the convenience, comfort, and
safety of others. The conflict between lawyers and psychiatrists is often characterized as the
clash of two commitments, one to patient autonomy and the other to patient welfare. See,
e.g., Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: Mental Patients' Right to Refuse Treatment,
72 Nw. U.L. REV.461,462-63 (1978) (state has delegated psychiatrists too much naked authority; "liberty" includes the freedom to decide about one's own health; external regulation
of modes of psychiatric treatment prevailing in state mental health hospitals an absolute
necessity); Treffert, Letter to the Editor: Dying With Their Rights On, 130 AM. J. PSYCHUTRY 1041 (1973) (persons who could not be civilly committed under revised procedures
designed to protect constitutional rights have suffered serious injury as a result of lack of
supervision and treatment). T o many lawyers, however, the conflict appears as one between
patient welfare, of which autonomy is a significant but not necessarily overriding component, and the welfare of others, to whom the psychiatrist does not owe the same loyalty.
Thus, lawyers and psychiatrists contrive to talk past one another.
PS 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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other unnecessary stricture inflicted on them by an uncomprehending judicial system. Their anxiety and antagonism are entirely understandable. The Tarasoff ruling did not create the role
conflict they are experiencing, however; it merely embodied and
perhaps reinforced a conflict that has long existed.

Tarasoff seems to have brought home to many psychiatrists the
double-bind quality of their professional obligations. Dissolution of
that bind will depend on more than individual response. It may
require psychiatrists to act collectively, to develop a professional
consensus that simply will not permit certain practices-such as
predicting the lifelong course of a defendant's behavior a t a sentencing proceeding. As psychiatrists generally recognize, bringing
the dimensions of a schizophrenegenic conflict into conscious
awareness, in and of itself, rarely is all that is needed to resolve the
problem.

C. Public Interest and Client Representation: T h e Role Conflict
of Lawyers
Lawyers too have been made painfully aware that loyalty to
their clients often comes into conflict with the responsibilities imposed on them in their role as "officers of the court." This role
conflict is also not a byproduct of institutional affiliation or of government support for legal services; it is encountered in the practice
of every member of the profession and does not lend itself to easy
"administrative" s~lution.~'
For a lawyer, the role conflict may be
For an early discussion of "the defense lawyer as double agent" in the context of plea
bargaining, see Blumberg, The Practice of Law a s Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC'YREV. 15,'20, 28 (1967) (analyzing the effects of "close
and continuing relations with the prosecuting office and the court itself' on defense lawyers,
"whether privately retained or of the legal-aid, public defender variety.")
Legal scholars and leaders of the bar gradually have abandoned the fallacy that the profession's ethical code, detailed and labored over as it mny be, can ever constitute a dispositive hierarchy of principle, an ethical algorithm that will yield the correct course of action
LAWYER'S
ETHICSIN AN ADfor the lawyer in each particular case. See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN,
VERSARY SYSTEM
~ i (1975);
i
G. HAZARD,
ETHICSI N THE PRACTICE
OF LAW56-57 (1978); Callan
& David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client
L. REV. 332, 335-36 (1976); Kutak, The
Misconduct in a n Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS
Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations About the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH.U.L. REV. 1, 6 (1980); Glenn, Book Review, 57 Tex. L. REV.307,
ETHICSIN THE PRACTICE
OF LAW(1978) and J. LIEBERMAN,
319 (1979) (reviewing G. HAZARD,
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even more distressing than it is for a psychiatrist; the lawyer's
sense of primary loyalty to the client is remarkably stronge2=It is
CRISISAT THE BAR:LAWYERS'
UNETHICAL
ETHICSAND WHATTO DO ABOUTIT (1978)). See also
Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: Void for Vagueness? 57 N.C.L. REV.
671 (1979); Discussion by Participants and Panel of Address of J. Ferren, The Corporate
Lawyer's Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW.1253, 1279 (1978).
The American Bar Association's MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE],promulgated in 1969, has been adopted in some form, albeit with
significant deletions and modifications, by the courts or legislatures of every state and the
District of Columbia (even California's idiosyncratic Rules of Professional Conduct bear
substantial resemblance; see CAL.BUS.& PROF.
CODE5 6076 Rules 1-23 (West 1974 & Supp.
1980). Dissatisfaction with the ABA CODE'Sambiguity, inconsistency, and failure to acknowledge the conflict among the lawyer's several roles provided the impetus for the appointment in 1977 of a blue-ribbon panel charged to undertake a "comprehensive rethinking
of the ethical premises and problems of the profession of law." American Bar Association
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards [hereinafter cited as Kutak Commission], Chairman's Introduction, MODELRULESOF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT
a t i (Proposed
Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED
MODELRULES].The release in January,
1980, of an entirely reworked ethical code entitled "Discussion Draft," definitely accomplished its purpose of provoking debate throughout the profession. See Burt, supra note 11,
a t 1017 n.15; see also Review Symposium: The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 1980
AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH
J. 923 (1980).
The Discussion Draft provision on the confidentiality of client communications garnered
particularly strong reaction, and apparently prompted another professional organization, the
American Trial Lawyers of America, to issue a rival code. See Burke, ATLA-ABA Tiff
Looms Over Altering Ethics Code, NAT'L L.J., May 19, 1980, a t 10. See also R. POUNDAMERICAN
TRIAL
LAWYER'S
FOUNDATION
COMMISSION
ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,
THE
AMERICAN
LAWYER'SCODEOF CONDUCT
(Public Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter cited as
ATLA CODE].The ATLA CODE'Sposition on confidentiality is notably stricter than that of
the American Bar Association both in its present Code or in its Proposed Model Rules. It
would all but prohibit disclosure of client confidences under almost any circumstances. See
ATLA CODERule 1.2-1.4 alternative B; Subin, War Over Client Confidentiality: I n Defense
of the Kutak Approach, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19, 1981, a t 22-23. However, the ATLA CODEhas
received little endorsement within the profession other than from its proponents.
The May 1981 Final Draft of the PROPOSED
MODELRULESappears to be less of a departure from the traditional model of professional behavior, a t least with respect to issues of
confidentiality. (However, some critics continue to caution that Proposed Rules 1.6, 1.13,
and 3.3 are more supportive of lawyer disclosure than they seem. Panel Presentation of
Professor Monroe Freedman to New York City Bar Association (Apr. 14, 1982). For further
discussion, see text accompanying note 184 infra. The American Bar Association House of
Delegates was unable to reach a firm decision about the PROPOSED
MODELRULESa t its August, 1982 convention, see Taylor, Dishonesty in Law: A New Ethics Code Is Sought, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17, 1982, a t A3, col. 1, and finally voted to defer further consideration. Regardless of the eventual decision, complaints about the inadequacies of the bar's attempts to
reduce its ethical precepts to writing doubtless will continue unabated. Of course, it is much
easier to criticize proposed solutions than to formulate them.
Po For an enlightening and much-cited discussion of the tensions created by lawyers'
role-differentiated behavior, see Wasserstrom, Lawyers a s Professionals: Some Moral Is-
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not uncommon for the lawyer to feel a genuine identification with
the client and the client's cause, especially in a relationship of
some duration. Even when the advocate's "warm zeal" is entirely
feigned, the distinctive dimension of representation-of acting for
and speaking for clients as well as to and about them-commands
an almost irreducible residue of allegiance.2eThe traditional role of
champion, or for those who prefer less honorific terms "hired gun,"
cannot easily comport with any act of betrayal, however publicspirited it may be.
Lawyers are almost obsessively preoccupied with preserving the
sues, 5 HUM.RTS. 1(1975). The definitive statement of the lawyer's sense of loyalty to client
is the even more frequently cited passage from Lord Brougham's defense of Queen Caroline
against George IV's bill for divorce in the House of Lords. It is repeated here for the sake of
those few readers who have escaped previous exposure:
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. T o save that client by all means and expedients, and
a t all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though
it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
8 (J. Nightingale ed. 1821). Lord Brougham, of course, wm
2 TRIUOF QUEENCAROLINE
engaged a t the time in calculated political maneuvers, not in meditation on the theme of the
advocate's professional responsibility. For an excellent analysis of the impact of this bromide and other classics of the legal-ethics literature on contemporary thinking about the
L.J.
lawyer's role, see Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY
909 (1980). Our current Chief Justice, Warren Burger, presented an interesting and a quite
different view of the optimal resolution of an advocate's role conflict in a concurring opinion
written while he still sat on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeale:
The advocate's role and duty. . . is not to "win" or set his client free, but to see
When
that the case is tried and reviewed in accordance with a set of rules
the advocate has done that, he has done his duty. He should not be asked to do
more and he ought not to do less.
Johnson v. United States, 360 F.2d 844, 847 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
This comment was preceded by the observation:
Few courts have stated this basic ethical duty more cogently than the Supreme
Court of Nebraska: An attorney owes his first duty to the court. He assumed his
obligations toward i t before he ever had a client. His oath requires him to be
absolutely honest even though his client's interests may seem to require a contrary
course.
Id. a t 846 n.2 (quoting In re Integration of Neb. State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 289, 276
N.W. 265,268 (1937)). The decision Justice Burger so heartily endorsed went on to declare:
"The lawyer cannot serve two masters; and the one [he has] undertaken to serve primarily is
the court." 133 Neb. a t 289, 275 N.W. a t 268.
*' See Wasserstrom, supra note 25, a t 14.

.. . .

H e i n o n l i n e - - 3 1 Emory L.

J. 278 1 9 8 2

19821

IMPLICATIONS OF TARASOFF

279

sanctity of client communications. Perhaps that is why they are
afforded potent protection by an attorney-client privilege in every
jurisdiction, state and federal.27 Geoffrey Hazard, Reporter for the
American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, calls the attorney-client privilege the "pivotal element of the modern American lawyer's professional f u n c t i ~ n . "Is~ ~
it the fact that almost everything lawyers do involves communication, either with clients or on behalf of clients, that makes lawyers
so unnerved by the prospect of mandatory disclosure? In the words
of one federal judge:
The broad commitment of the lawyer to respect confidences
reposed in him is his talisman. Touching the very soul of
lawyering, it rests upon a "privilege" which is that of the client, not that of the lawyer. Inaccurately described as the
"lawyer's privilege against testifying," the privilege of clients
to bind their lawyers to secrecy is universally honored and
enforced as productive of social values more important than
the search for truth. Canon 4 [the ethical mandate to preserve
client confidences] is designed to preserve the trust of the client in his lawyer, without which the practice of law, whatever
else it might become, would cease to be a profes~ion.~~

'' See the exhaustive table of authorities in Callan & David, supra note 24, a t 338 n.31.
For a classic definition of the elements of the privilege, see United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). The importance of the privilege to
"sound legal advice or advocacy" has been reatlirmed by the Supreme Court in a pair of
recent cases, see Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (proper representation
possible only when client need not apprehend disclosure); Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (attorney-client privilege rooted in imperative need for confidence and
trust between lawyer and client).
Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF.L.
REV.1061, 1061 (1978).
2e Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 905 (1978). See also the concurring opinion of Judge Mountain in I n re Callan, 66 N.J.
401, 331 A.2d 612 (1975):
In some substantial degree, the effectiveness of the representation an attorney affords his client will depend upon the quality of the relationship that exists between them. And only if that relationship is one of utter trust and confidence on
the part of the client will he communicate with his attorney in a completely candid and uninhibited manner. Of perhaps paramount importance in inducing this
kind of relationship and trust is a conviction on the part of the client that his
communications will not be revealed to others. It would be difficult to exaggerate
the importance of this factor.
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Outsiders are scarcely sympathetic when lawyers place the preservation of client confidences above the arguably more compelling
interest of preventing harm to other identifiable individuals. We
need only recall the notorious "where the bodies are buried" case.30
To many lawyers, the refusal of Robert Garrow's attorneys to divulge his secrets, despite the plea by the father of one of Garrow's
victims to know whether his daughter was alive or dead, was the
only ethical choice. To most onlookers, the attorneys' behavior appeared not merely unheroic but downright inhuman.31 The eventual dismissal of the indictment lodged against them32and the bar
association's vindication of their position33 could not have altogether assuaged the revilement they suffered.
Lawyers have been subjected to more than criticism for failing to
disclose confidential information about their clients. They have
been held in contempt of court and ordered to jail:'
suspended
Id. at 408-09, 331 A.2d a t 617.
30 See People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d 186,372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Onondaga Cty. Ct.), aff'd, 50
A.D.2d 1088,376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (4th Dep't 1975), afd, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 359 N.E.2d 377, 390
N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). See also M. FREEDMAN,
supra note 24, a t 1.
People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d a t 189,372 N.Y.S.2d a t 801 ("Public indignation reached
a hue and a cry went up from the press and other news media
."); see
a fever pitch
Freedman, Where the Bodies Are Buried: The Adversary System and the Obligation of
Confidentiality, 10 CRIM.L. BULL.979,979 (1974) ("Members of the public were shocked at
the apparent callousness of these lawyers, whose conduct was seen as typifying the unhealthy lack of concern of most lawyers with the public interest and with simple decency.").
See also the catalogue of public outcry in Chamberlain, Legal Ethics, Confidentiality and
L. REV.211, 221-22 n.64 (1975). For the
the Case of Robert Carrow's Lawyers, 25 BUPPALO
TREATMENT
OF THE MENTALLY
ILL
reaction of a psychiatrist, see M. PESZKE,INVOLUNTARY
140 (1975) ("The recent case from New York State in which attorneys knew about a murder
but did not inform the authorities and kept the parents of the murdered child in suspense is
accepted and condoned by canon ethics, but revolting to the moral and common sense attitude of most citizens!"). Those who judged Garrow's attorneys with such severity presumably did not ask themselves whether they would want to be represented by a lawyer whose
loyalty was less single-minded. Somehow, it is usually the other fellow's lawyer who ought to
have been more concerned about the public.
3Z People v. Belge, 83 Misc. 2d a t 191, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
s3 New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 479 (1978).
=' See, e.g., I n re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Lawson), 600 F.2d 215 (9th
Cir. 1979) (refusal to provide names of clients to grand jury); In re January 1976 Grand
Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976) (refusal to comply with subpoena to produce money received from clients suspected of bank robbery); I n re Kozlov, 156 N.J. Super. 316, 383 A.2d
1158 (1978) (refusal to reveal name of client who was source of information about prejudiced
juror), rev'd, 79 N.J. 232, 398 A.2d 882 (1979); I n re Callan, 122 N.J. Super. 479, 300 A.2d

...
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and prosecuted for aiding and abetting their clifrom
ents in violating the law.36 The courts, administrative agencies and
disciplinary committees that imposed these penalties were unmoved by the argument that lawyers cannot function without the
complete trust of their clients. Since clients are not entitled to legal assistance in the planning or commission of a crime or tort:?
encouraging them to rely on the lawyer's fidelity in the context of
ongoing or anticipated misconduct is seen as serving no valid purpose. However, trying to determine whether client confidences are
in the sacrosanct category of past offenses, in which case a lawyer
should risk incarceration to protekt
or whether they consti-'
868 (Ch. Div.), aff'd, 126 N.J. Super. 103, 312 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1973), rev'd, 66 N.J. 401,
331 A.2d 612 (1975) (failure to disclose client violation of court order); Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St. 2d 176, 358 N.E.2d 521 (1976) (refusal to disclose client's address). See
also State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828,394 P.2d 681 (1964) (refusal to produce
knife allegedly used in murder by client).
I n re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va), aff'd per curium, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.
1967) (attorney hid proceeds of and weapons used during bank robbery); I n re Carter, [I981
Transfer Binder] FED.SEC.L. REP.(CCH) U 82,847 (Feb. 28,1981) (corporate counsel failed
to disclose fraudulent scheme of management; suspension from practice before the SEC reversed because unambiguous standards of professional conduct covering their activity did
not exist a t time; held, prospectively, that attorneys aware of client's failure to satisfy disclosure requirements must take "prompt steps"). See also I n re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ct.
App. Ky. 1951) (attorney suspended for failure to correct client's statement during hearing
which attorney knew to be false).
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682,713-15 (D.D.C. 1978) (failure to try to prevent closing of corporate merger and to disclose to shareholders and to SEC
confidential information received from client's auditor constitutes aiding and abetting violation of securities laws; injunctive relief denied). For a list of other opinions filed in connection with this much-litigated case, and reference to the lengthy bibliography it generated,
see Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Judicial Conference for the District of Columbia
Circuit, 89 F.R.D. 169, 223, n.2 (1980).
See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1(1933); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d
895, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143,144 (4th Cir. 1967);
MODEL
RULES,supra note 24, Rule 1.6, Note
and other authorities enumerated in PROPOSED
on Exceptions to Confidentiality a t 44. See generally UNW.R. E m . 502(d)(l) (1953);
Rule 212 (1942); Note, The Future Crime or Tort Exception to
MODELCODEOF EVIDENCE
Communications Privileges, 77 HARV.L. REV.730 (1964), and authorities cited therein.
" See People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 101 (1954) ("Attorney
should have chosen to go to jail and take his chances of release by a higher court."); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 312 (unpublished) cited in Callan & David,
supra note 24, a t 345 n.53 (attorney should refuse to disclose privileged communication
"though the court [may] send him to jail"). See also New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 528 (1981) (lawyer need not comply immediately with court order
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tute potential threats or reveal continuing wrongdoing, in which
case a lawyer probably should report them to the appropriate aut h o r i t i e ~ ,has
~ ~ proven an elusive task and a perilous enterprise.
The range and diversity of professional ethical opinion on almost
Judge Skelly Wright calls these
any single issue is e~traordinary.~~
to disclose client confidence which is subject to reversal or modification on appeal, even if
faced with risk of being held in contempt).
See ABA CODE,supra note 24, DR 7-102(B)(1) (lawyer should reveal client fraud on
tribunal, committed in course of lawyer's representation; in some jurisdictions, not applicable if information considered a client confidence or secret); ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 155 (1936) (lawyer should reveal future unlawful act or
COMMITTEE
ON ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
continuing wrong); ABA STANDING
JUSTICE,
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE--THE
DEFENSEFUNCTION,
Standard 4-3.7(d) (2d
(lawyer must reveal expressed intention of
ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]
client to commit crime and information required to prevent crime that would seriously endanger life or safety of person or corrupt processes of courts). (The ABA STANDARDS
are
purely hortatory in that they are not the law of any jurisdiction, nor are they enforced by
the disciplinary structure of the profession.) But see ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (lawyer must advise court not to rely on lawyer's
silence to corroborate client's lack of prior criminal record, but cannot reveal client's past
perjury); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1976)
(confidential privilege must be upheld over obligation to notify court of client's fraud on
tribunal).
'O For example, on the relatively discrete issue of revealing a fugitive client's whereabouts, compare ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 23 (1930)
(no duty to disclose generally) with ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances,
Formal Op. 155 (1936) (duty to disclose when client has fled jurisdiction) and ABA Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1141 (1970) (depending on whether fugitive seeks advice concerning "rights" or concerning how he can "best remain a fugitive," lawyer either
cannot disclose or, if fugitive refuses to surrender, must disclose whereabouts) and Arizona
State Bar Comm. On Professional Ethics, Op. 65 (1960), reprinted in 6 ARIZ.BARJ. 15
(1970) (no ethical obligation of disclosure prior to arrest) and Michigan State Bar Comm. on
Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. 163 (1954), reprinted in 38 MICH.BARJ. 216 (1969)
(no duty to disclose generally) and New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 528 (1981) (client's whereabouts clearly confidential and need not be disclosed) and
New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 529 (1981) (lawyer not required to withdraw from representation of fugitive who refuses to surrender) overruling New
York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 405 (1975). Compare also New
York County Lawyer's Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 462 (1958) (no duty to
disclose) and New York City Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 81-13 (1981, as
amended 1982) (attorney has option, but no duty t o disclose), reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6,
1982, a t 26; Dec. 31, 1981, a t 2, and North Carolina Bar Council on Professional Ethics, Op.
385 (1962), reprinted in 9 N.C. BAR14 (1962) (duty to disclose arises when client practices
fraud or deception). See also Matter of Jacqueline F., 94 Misc. 2d 96, 404 N.Y.S.2d 790
(Bronx Cty. Surr. Ct. 1978), aff'd, 65 A.D.2d 545, 409 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dept. 1978), aff'd,
47 N.Y.2d 215,391 N.E.2d 967,417 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1979) (depending upon circumstances of
case, address of client may or may not be privileged; attorney could be compelled on pain of
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questions "as uncharted as they are funda~nental."~'

D. Role Conflict in Law. and in Psychiatry
1. Similarities

Lawyers, then, are no strangers to the kind of role conflict that
psychiatrists feel was imposed on them by the Tarasoff ruling.
Like psychiatrists, lawyers have reacted to efforts to moderate
their loyalty to clients by conjuring up the image of professional
colleagues in the Eastern Bloc. Horror stories of Cuban and Bulgarian lawyers who, instead of defending their clients, more or less
acquiesce in their execution" are reminiscent of the tocsin sounded
about the role of Soviet psychiatry in suppressing dissidence. In
each instance, the profession has countered a perceived threat to
its autonomous self-regulation with the slippery-slope argument
that "it could happen here."

It is disconcerting for a lawyer trained in our adversary system
to read statements such as those of Ma Rongjie, a prominent criminal defense lawyer from the People's Republic of China. Speaking
of his defense of Jiang Qing, the widow of Mao Zedong and one of
the Gang of Four, Mr. Ma explained that there never was any reason for him to meet his client because "the police and the prosecutors worked on the case a long time, and the evidence they found
which wasn't true they threw away."" In China, said Mr. Ma, lawyers are "servants of the state" and their role is limited to pleading
mitigating circumstances for clients whose guilt is largely predetermined." Yet even under such a system, some vestige of the lawyer's professional responsibility to suppress emotions contradictory
to the needs of the client can be detected. During the Cultural
contempt to disclose, notwithstanding privilege claim); Richards v. Richards, 64 Misc. 285,
119 N.Y.S. 81, aff'd, 143 A.D. 906, 127 N.Y.S. 1141 (1st Dept. 1911) (address of client is
unprivileged). But see Waldmann v. Waldmann, 48 Ohio St. 2d 176,358 N.E.2d 521 (1976)
(client's address held privileged when it relates to the business and interest of client).
41 United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See, e.g., M. FREEDMAN,
supra note 24, at 2; Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALEL.J.1060, 1060-61 n.1 (1976).
4S Margolick, Defense Lawyer for the Gang of Four Retains H
is Faith in C h i ~ aN.Y.
,
Times, Jan. 6, 1982, at B5, col. 1.
44 Id.
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Revolution, Mr. Ma had spent eight years in prison or at hard labor. As he put it, "the Gang of Four has caused me a lot of
trouble." "But," he went on, "I am a lawyer. Even if I hated them
I had to help them."45 Many American lawyers might say exactly
the same thing.
2. And a Difference

In view of the parallel trends in law and in psychiatry toward
increasing emphasis on the professional's duty to people other than
the client or patient, it is hardly surprising that after Tarasoff a
movement began to impose a mandatory obligation, as opposed to
a discretionary power, on attorneys to disclose client confidences
when the consequences of not doing so might place the life or
safety of a third party in jeopardy. That movement seems to have
stalled temporarily, and the previous understanding that lawyers
should exercise professional judgment in determining when, if ever,
to resort to disclosure of client confidences seems to have been reinstated. As this paper tries to show, the analogy between a psychiatrist caught in a Tarasoffbind and the lawyer in a similar situation has superficial appeal but ultimately is unconvincing. Because
of the unique status of psychiatrists in our society, the psychiatrist-patient relationship must be distinguished from all others,
and its limits differently defined.

E. The Power of Psychiatrists
The historical development of psychiatrists' power to influence a
broad array of legal rights has been exhaustively documented, and
need not be reiterated here. In his final book, Dr. Robitscher provided a comprehensive summary of the dimensions of this p o ~ e r . ' ~
To mention only a few: psychiatric opinions of mental competence
are usually conclusive, whether they focus on the general ability to
manage affairs or on a specific capacity, such as the capacity to
assist in one's defense a t a criminal trial. Psychiatric findings of
prior incompetence can void a will, a contract, or a marriage. PsyId. at B1, col. 4.
J. ROBITSCHER,
Fifty-One Ways Psychiatrists Exercise Authority, in THEPOWERS
OP
PSYCHIATRY
401 (1980).
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chiatrists could enable a man to avoid the draft or a woman to get
an abortion, when those were crucial issues (as soon they may be
again). Psychiatric evaluations are often required in the processing
of an application for a "sensitive" job in private industry as well as
in the military or government. Psychiatric testimony frequently
will decide the question of child custody. And since the time of
Benjamin Rush and Phillipe Pinel, physicians of the mind have
been able to excuse the criminally accused from moral responsibility and legal guilt.
Psychiatrists make the plausible point that these so-called "powers" are illusory, since their expert opinions may be rejected in
their entirety by the judges and juries who hear them. Dr. Robitscher discounted that point as theoretically valid but of minimal
significance in actual practice. "The argument of psychiatrists that
decisions are made by courts, not psychiatrists, does not stand up.
In fact, courts do not understand psychiatry; they rely on psychiatrists to interpret psychiatric issues in legal terms, and in very
many cases they accept psychiatric testimony ~ncritically."~~
The most dramatic illustration of the effect of psychiatric expertise on legal rights has always been its use to deprive people of
their liberty, either temporarily and directly through an emergency
commitment order, or indefinitely and indirectly through testimony supportive of judicial c ~ m m i t m e n t .It~ ~was this power to
Id. a t 27. See also Settle & Oppegard, The Pre-Trial Examination of Federal Defendants, 35 F.R.D. 475, 479-80 (1965) (courts tend to rely "almost 100%" on the results of
psychiatric evaluations in determining competence to stand trial); Vann & Morganroth, The
Psychiatrist a s Judge: A Second Look a t Competence to Stand Trial, 43 U. DET. L.J. 1, 9
(1965) (psychiatric determinations of competency are rarely questioned; "judges tend to follow recommendations of psychiatrists"). This may be particularly true with respect to civil
commitment proceedings. See Monahan, Empirical Analysis of Civil Commitment: Critique
and Context, 11 L. & SOC'YREV.619, 622-23 (1977) (reporting on clinical investigations
that found judges ordering commitments based on psychiatric recommendations despite explicit findings of no supporting evidence); Wexler, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice, in MENTAL
HEALTH
LAW:MAJORISSUES 71,101 (1981) (''The judge whosigns the commitment order is the most significant figure in the commitment process by only a small
margin. The physician's recommendation is probably the most important single factor in the
commitment decision.").
Every jurisdiction, either by statute or through common law, permits the immediate
detention for medical evaluation of persons alleged to be mentally ill and "dangerous" to
themselves, to others, or to property. Most states provide for long-term confinement of indi-
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commit that Dr. Robitscher called "a basic underpinning of psychiatric authority" which "sets psychiatrists apart from others in
~ ~the last decade, however, death penalty statutes
our s o ~ i e t y . "In
that require an assessment of the probability that a given defenviduals certified as "in need of care and treatment." State statutory schemes vary enormously in terms of the specific conditions for their invocation, the procedural safeguards
associated with them, and the qualiications of those licensed to initiate such proceedings
(ranging from "next friend" through "peace officer" to "physician") See Brake1 & Rock,
DISABLED
AND THE LAW(rev. ed. 1971).
Involuntary Hospitalization, in THEMENTALLY
However, the element of mental illness, albeit under a host of different titles, is an indispensable predicate of all these schemes, see, e.g., Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some
Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGALEDUC.24, 32 (1970); Developments in the Law
-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,87 HARV.L. REV.1190,1202 (1974), and ultimately
the participation of a psychiatrist is required to confirm a diagnosis of mental illness.
The ferment in this area of the law has spawned an immense forensic literature and n
complex jurisprudence on the criteria and pFocesses by which involuntary civil commitment
may be authorized. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (commitment of minor at
parent's request requires inquiry by neutral fact finder; requirement may be satisfied by
thorough psychiatric investigation and review); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
(clear and convincing evidence standard for involuntary civil commitment required by 14th
Amendment); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (state cannot constitutionally
confine a nondangerous person capable of surviving safely in freedom); Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966) (judicial determination of dangerousness and mental illness required to
"recommit1' prisoner whose sentence expired); I n re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C.Cir. 1973)
(burden of proof of mental illness and dangerousness in involuntary civil commitment proceeding must be beyond reasonable doubt); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972) (constitutional right to individual treatment if involuntarily committed), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wi. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (due process safeguard of a
preliminary hearing is required prior to an involuntary commitment); Dixon v. Attorney
Gen., 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (formal hearing required to "recommit" mentally
disabled). See also Elliot, Procedures for Involuntary Commitment on the Basis of Alleged
Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO.L. REV.231 (1970) (recent trend toward giving greater weight to
psychiatric judgment concerning involuntary hospitalization); Livermore, Malmquist, &
Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV.75 (1968) (ease with
which one is classified as mentally ill should raise doubt as to the validity of sole reliance on
psychiatric evaluation); Robitscher, Legal Standards and Their Implications Regarding
A PROBLEM
IN LAWAND MENTAL
Civil Commitment Procedures, in DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR:
HWTH61 (C. Frederick ed. 1978); Roth, Dayley, & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric
Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTACLARAL. REV. 400 (1973)
(court commitment hearings place a barrier between unfettered psychiatric discretion and
the patient); Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guardposts in Civil Commitment
DAMELAW.53 (1979) (state statutes employ traditional due process
Proceedings, 55 NOTRE
protections in civil commitment).
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
183,188
Robitscher, The Limits of Psychiatric Authority, 1INT'L
(1978).
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dant will pose a "continuing threat to society"60 have provided
psychiatrists with the opportunity to dispense not just liberty but
life.

A Texas psychiatrist, James Grigson, has not hesitated to conclude from a 90-minute "mental status examination" that the defendant he examined was a "sociopath" who could not be treated
or rehabilitated and who would commit further acts of violence.51
Dr. Grigson apparently has yet to meet a defendant whom he does
not think dangerous. His testimony for the prosecution in dozens
of cases has resulted in a long list of capital sentences, earning the
psychiatrist the ghastly sobriquet of "Dr. Death."62 Only within
the past year has the Supreme Court prohibited the practice of
compelling defendants in custody to submit to such examination
without notice to their counsel and warnings about the purpose of
the inter vie^.^^ The Court refused, however, to exclude from sentencing proceedings psychiatric testimony on the propensity of a
defendant to commit violence, thereby tacitly endorsing the claim
that psychiatrists can make such p r e d i ~ t i o n s . ~ ~
no See, e.g., IDAHO
CODE5 19-2515(f)(8) (1979); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2)
(Vernon 1981); WASH.REV.CODEANN.5 10.94.020 (repealed 1981). See also Bonnie, Foreword, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV.
167, 177-78 (1980) ("Since courts will not ordinarily possess the clinical sophistication to
determine whether an opinion rests on an accepted theoretical foundation, we must depend
on clinicians themselves, as a matter of professional ethics, to be sensitive to the limits of
their own expertise and to qualify their opinions accordingly."); Dix, Participation by
Mental Health Professionals in Capital Murder Sentencing, 1INT'LJ. L. & PSYCHIATRY
283
(1978) (the extent to which testimony by mental health professionals is relied upon in the
imposition of the death penalty varies from state to state); Dix, The Death Penalty, "Dangerousness," Psychiatric Testimony and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM.L. 151 (1977)
(psychiatric testimony is relied upon in determining an individual's dangerouness to
society).
O1 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457-60 (1981).
" See Tierney, Doctor, Is This Man Dangerous? 3 Scr. 82 a t 28 (June 1982). See also J.
ROBITSCHER,
supra note 7, at 199-204.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
" Id. at 472-73. But cf. People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733,767,631 P.2d 446,466,175
Cal. Rptr. 738,759 (1981) (court reversed first degree homicide conviction because of admission a t penalty phase of trial of testimony of psychopharmacologist who predicted defendant would probably "engage in future violence"; court noted "[elxpert predictions that
persons will commit future acts of violence are unreliable, and frequently erroneous; . .
such forecasts, despite their unreliability and doubtful relevance, may be extremely
prejudicial.").

.
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It may well be that these extraordinary powers were more or less
thrust upon the psychiatric profession by a society anxious to seize
upon some "scientific" basis for their exercise. Until quite recently,
however, psychiatrists have not sought in any organized fashion to
disavow either this authority or its underlying rationale: their supposed ability to determine from a clinical evaluation that an individual is "dangerous." Even though the American Psychiatric Association authorized and filed an amicus brief in Estelle v. Smith
challenging Grigson's te~timony,6~
only a few mental health professionals have deplored Dr. Grigson's role in Texas courts. It was the
profession's willingness to accept attribution of a peculiar expertise
in predicting future conduct that landed psychiatrists in the
Tarasoffquandary.

III. THETarasoffDECISION
A. The Facts of Tarasope
Prosenjit Poddar was a Bengali of the Harijan (untouchable)
caste who had worked his way up through the Indian educational
system. He was sent to study naval architecture at the Berkeley
campus of the Unversity of California in the fall of 1967. A year
later, he met a young woman, Tatiana Tarasoff, whose variable responses to his attentions he evidently misinterpreted. After her
final rejection of him, Poddar became inconsolably dejected and
began to exhibit symptoms of clinical depression: eating and sleeping irregularly, failing to keep up with his studies or his job, and
listening endlessly to tape recordings he had secretly .made of his
conversations with the girl. In June of 1969, at the urging of a
O6 Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 11, Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (urging a limited prohibition on testimony as to long-term predictions of violence by psychiatrists).
* The statement of Tarasof's facts in this section derives from numerous sources,
principally the following: People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750,518 P.2d 342,111 Cal. Rptr. 910
(1974); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90
HARV.L. REV. 358 (1976); Wilade, Psychotherapeutic Discretion and Judicial Decision: A
Case of Enigmatic Justice, hi THELAW-WICINE
RELATION:
A PHILOSOPHICAL
EWLORATION
139 (H.T. Engelhardt, J. Healey, & S. Spicker eds. 1981). There are at least a score of other
articles about this celebrated case in the academic legal literature alone. See the list in Note,
Discovery of Psychotherapist-Patient Communications after Tarasoff, 15 SANDIEGOL.
REV.265, 266 n.8 (1978).
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friend, Poddar agreed to become a voluntary outpatient a t the student health service. Diagnosed as an acute paranoid schizophrenic,
Poddar was placed under the care of a clinical psychologist.
In late August, after a total of nine therapy sessions, Poddar
confided to his therapist that he intended to kill Tatiana when she
returned from summer vacation. (Although he did not identify the
subject of his threats by name, there was apparently no contention
that her identity was not easily ascertainable.) In addition, the
friend who had originally persuaded Poddar to seek professional
help had reported to the therapist that Poddar planned to buy a
gun. When the therapist asked his patient to promise fiat to harm
Tatiana, Poddar left in a huff. The therapist, after consulting with
two psychiatrists, decided to commit Poddar for observation and
requested assistance from the campus police.67 Within three days,
several officers took Poddar into custody and searched his rooms.
They released him after he managed to convince them that he was
rational and that he would stay away from Tatiana.
Poddar never returned to therapy and no subsequent effort was
made either to commit him or to contact Tatiana or her family.
Instead, the clinic director specifically ordered that all records of
the commitment attempt be destroyed, which in fact was not done,
and that no further action be taken, supposedly because he did not
The therapist's letter to W i a m Beall, Chief of Campus Police, dated August 20,
1969, read as follows:
Dear Chief Beall:
Mr. Poddar was first seen a t Cowell Hospital by Dr. Stuart Gold, June 5,1969, on an emergency basis. After receiving medication he was referred to the outpatient psychiatry clinic
for psychotherapy. Since then I have seen him here seven times.
His mental status varies considerably. At times he appears to be quite rational, a t other
times he appears quite psychotic. It is my impression that currently the appropriate diagnosis for him is paranoid schizophrenic reaction, acute and severe. He is a t this point a danger
to the welfare of other people and himself. That is, he had been threatening to kill an unnamed girl who he feels has betrayed
and violated his honor. He has told a friend of hi
(Farrokhq Mistree, also of International House) that he intends to go to San Francisco to
buy a gun and that he plans to kill the girl. He has been somewhat more cryptic with me,
but he has alluded strongly to the compulsion to "get even with," and "hurt" the girl.
I have discussed this matter with Dr. Gold and we concur in the opinion that Mr. Poddar
should be committed for observation in a mental hospital. I request the assistance of your
department in this matter. [Signed] Lawrence Moore, Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist. Department of Psychiatry (on file with the author).
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want the judgment of the campus police called into question.
Meanwhile, Poddar had developed a friendship with Tatiana's
brother Alex and had become his roommate. ~ l e knew
x
that Poddar had threatened his sister, but, for whatever reasons, did not
take the threat seriously.
After Tatiana's return to campus that fall, Poddar plagued the
girl, constantly trying to see and speak with her. She rebuffed him
unequivocally. Poddar's obsession peaked in late October. He
fought with Alex, who warned him that if Poddar did not leave
Tatiana alone, he would suffer at the hands of her father. That did
not keep Poddar from repeatedly going to the Tarasoff home and
demanding to see Tatiana. Finally, on the evening of October 27,
1969, Poddar found Tatiana home alone. She allowed him to come
in, but soon asked him to leave. He shot her with a pellet gun and
stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead. He then called the police and surrendered.
During a seventeen day trial, Poddar's attorney raised both an
insanity and a diminished capacity defense. The jury found him
sane and his capacity for specific intent unimpaired, and convicted
him of second-degree murder. On appeal, the conviction was reversed due to a flaw in the jury instructions. Since it appeared unlikely that a retrial held more than five years after the first would
result in a conviction, the State agreed to release Poddar on condition that he immediately return to India, where he is now married
to a lawyer-it is said, happily so.
Tatiana's parents sued the psychologist, the psychiatrists, the
campus police, and the University of California for $200,000 in
damages, citing two causes of action: the failure to warn them or
Tatiana of the impending danger, and the negligent failure to
bring about Poddar's commitment. It seemed evident that statutory governmental immunity shielded a l l the defendants from liability for erroneous decisions in the commitment process, so that
the only remaining foundation for the suit was what the plaintiffs
dubbed a "duty to warn."

H e i n o n l i n e - - 3 1 Emory L. J. 2 9 0 1 9 8 2

19821

IMPLICATIONS OF TARASOFF

B. Rationale and Analysis
1. The Duty To Warn

In the absence of a specific statutory provision to the contrary,
there generally is no aflirmative duty to control the behavior of
another, nor to warn a third person of another's threat.6s In other
words, as one commentator on Tarasoff notesP9 had Poddar confided his homicidal intention to a neighbor or the local barkeep,
that individual would bear no legal responsibility for failing to disclose the danger or prevent the tragedy, despite the absence of any
legal or ethical obligation to preserve confidentiality. Before
Tarasoff the only exceptions to this general proposition were two
situations: when a special relationship, usually custodial but always
controlling, existed between the party considered responsible and a
person whose dangerousness had, or should have, been recognized;
and when there had been an express undertaking by the party considered responsible to protect or warn a foreseeable victim.BO
For example, cases in many jurisdictions have imposed liability
on psychiatric hospitals for injuries resulting from negligent supervision or release of a dangerous inpatient and, in one instance,
even for injury due to negligent failure to admit a patient who
presented himself for care.61 Damages have also been assessed
See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS 8 315 (1965); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE
LAWOF TORTS
8 356 (4th ed. 1971); Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another, 43 YALEL.J.886 (1934).
Be See Note, Torts-Duty to Act for Protection of Another-Liability of Psychotherapist for Failure to Warn of Homicide Threatened by Patient, 28 VAND.L. REV.631, 639
(1975).
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,435, 551 P.2d 334,343, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976). See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS 315-20 (1965).
See Greenberg v. Barbour, 322 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. P a 1971). See also Semler v. Psychiatric Inst, 538 F.2d 121 (4th Ci.) (negligent release of dangerous patient in violation of
court order), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Hicks v. United States, 511 F.2d 407 (D.C.
Cir. 1975) (negligent failure to diiclose records to court resulting in release of dangerous
patient); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966) (negligent failure to
transfer records to new psychiatrist resulting in release of dangerous patient); Smith v.
United States, 437 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (negligent transfer of suicidal patient to
open facility), reu'd on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1978); Merchants Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967) (negligent failure of veterans
administration hospital to warn employer of furloughed patient of his "dangerousness" enabled patient to escape supervision and kill his wife);Department of Health & Rehabilitative
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against guardians for failure to warn a temporary caretaker of the
violent disposition of a minor
Agencies of the state have
been held responsible for failing to warn foreseeable victims that a
prisoner was about to be paroled, but only when there had been a
prior promise to do
Finally, returning to a medical context,
physicians have been required to compensate those infected as a
result of their failure to diagnose and to warn others about a pa.~~
most of these cases, however, the
tient's contagious c o n d i t i ~ n In
Sews. v. McDougall, 359 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (negligent supervision by
hospital personnel resulted in escape of dangerous inmate). But cf. Centeno v. New York, 48
A.D.2d 812, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932 (1976):
Although another physician might disagree as to the form and period of treatment
to be followed, a liability would not arise; nor would i t arise if the professional
i
m was in fact erroneous. The prediction of the future
judgment to discharge h
course of a mental illness is a professional judgment of high responsibility and in
some instances it involves a measure of calculated risk. If a liability were imposed
on the physician or the State each time the prediction of future course of mental
disease was wrong, few releases would ever be made and the hope of recovery and
rehabilitation of a vast number of patients would be impeded and frustrated. This
is one of the medical and public risks which must be taken on balance, even
though it may sometimes result in injury to the patient or others.
Id. at 813, 369 N.Y.S.2d a t 711 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932 (1976).
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968)
(parole authority held responsible for not warning foster parents that ward placed in their
care was dangerous); Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) (parenb
held responsible for failiig to warn babysitter that child was "dangerous"). See generally
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)
OF TORTS
5 316 (1965).
6S See, e.g., Morgan v
. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938,41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1964)
(county liable for s h e m s failure to warn decedent of release of dangerous prisoner after
promisiig to do so). But cf. Wiiarns v. State, 308 N.Y. 548, 127 N.E.2d 545 (1955) (as a
matter of public policy, state would not be liable for death caused by escaped convict, even
if negligently permitted to escape; state's duty with respect to psychiatric patients greater
than with respect to prisoners). The decision in Thompson v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal.
App. 3d 936, 152 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1979), a post-Tarasoff case indicating that liability could
attach to a state agency responsible for releasing a dangerous ward without warning those
foreseeably endangered, even in the absence of a prior promise to do so, was reversed by the
California Supreme Court. 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980) (en banc).
See, e.g., Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385,227 S.W. 612 (1921) (physician can be held
liable for negligent failure to advise nurses and parents of risk from child with typhoid
fever); Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (holding physician
owes duty to minor chid living with parent suffering contagious disease to inform those
charged with minor's care of disease and steps necessary to prevent child's exposure), cert.
denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla 1971); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919)
(physician's duty to notify public officials and parents of danger from child with scarlet
fever); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of America, 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct.
1959) (failure to advise wife of husband's tuberculosis held actionable); Jones v. Stanko, 118
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physician had not complied with an explicit statutory mandate to
report every case of a particular infectious disease.66
These decisions reflect the policy judgment that, in some situations, the person most likely to foresee an injury should bear the
risk of its occurrence and the burden of taking steps to prevent it.
Before Tarasoff, however, no court had ever extended this principle to a psychotherapist's relationship with a voluntary outpatient.
In addition, the California statute under which Poddar's emergency detention could have been authorized seems clearly to prohibit disclosure of confidential information, except to the patient's
relatives or to law enforcement agencies.B6In asking the campus
police for assistance, the Berkeley therapists had adhered to the
exact course of action prescribed by the statute.
The trial judge felt constrained to dismiss the case since there
was no direct precedent for the claim. The plaintiffs appealed the
dismissal of their case to California's Supreme Court. In Tarasoff
u. Regents of the University of C a l i f ~ r n i a that
, ~ ~ court reversed
the dismissal and reinstated the claims against both the police and
the therapists. This meant that the plaintiffs would be permitted
to try to prove their allegations a t a trial, and if successful, could
collect damages attributable to the failure of the police and the
therapists to warn them of Poddar's threat. .The court focused its
attention on the abortive effort to commit Poddar, characterizing
it as a "Good Samaritan" act-a step that need not be attempted
but that once undertaken must be carried out in a non-negligent
fashion.68
Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928) (failure to notify public officials and "persons in proximity" to smallpox victim of contagious nature of disease can constitute negligence). See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. 926 (1920); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons 480') (1951 & Supp.
1981); 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers 245-46 (1981).
LAW5s 2101,2225-2226,2300 (McKinney 1977 & Supp.
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB.HEALTH
1981).
" CAL.WELP.& INST.CODE 5328.3 (West 1972).
13 Cal. 3d 177,529 P.2d 553,118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tarasoff

s

I].

" On the duty of a "Good Samaritan" to proceed non-negligently, see generally
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALEL.J. 247, 276 nn.113-15 (1980). Most
states, however, protect physicians and other medical personnel from liability for consequences of even negligent acts committed while gratuitously aiding people in emergencies.
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2. A Special Relationship

The psychiatric profession's outraged reaction to TarasoffIB8led
the California Supreme Court to take the unusual step of granting
a petition for rehearing. This time, the defendants were assisted by
the filing of several amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the American
Psychiatric Association and other professional organi~ations.~~
Eighteen months after the original ruling, a final decision was
rendered.
Again, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal
and reinstituted the suit, holding:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of
his profession should determine, that his patient presents a
serious threat of violence to another, he incurs an obligation
to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon
the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the
intended victim or others likely to apprise the victim of the
danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps
are reasonably necessary under the circumstances."

At the same time the court cautioned:
We realize that the open and confidential character of psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages patients to express
See generally G. &NAS, L. GLANTZ,
& B. KATZ,THERIGHTSOF DOCTORS,
NURSESAND ALLIED HEALTH
PROPESSIONALS
106-07 (1981); Zaremski, Good Samaritan Statutes: Do They
NEWS5 (1979).
Protect the Emergency Care Provider? 7 MEDICOLEGAL
For example: "To make a law of this understanding puts psychiatrists in a position
Jan. 20,
where they have to respond even to idle threats." Therapists and Threats, TIME,
1975, a t 56 (statement of Dr. Alfred Freedman, past prenident of the American Psychiatric
Association); "The soundest practice is to try to defuse n person's homicidal urges through
treatment. The minute you report them, they drop out of therapy.
If you locked up
everybody who made a threat there wouldn't be enough room in the hospitals." California
Court Limits Doctor-Patient Privilege, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25,1974, a t 15, col. 1(statement of
Dr. Morris Grossman, Stanford University Professor Emeritus of Psychiatry).
l o Other organizations included the California State Psychiatric Association, the San
Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute, the National Association of Social Workers, and the California Hospital Association.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,431,551 P.2d 334, 340, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).

...
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threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. Certainly
a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal such
threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the patient's
relationship with his therapist and with the persons
threatened. To the contrary, the therapist's obligations to his
patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such
disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others and even
then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened dangersT2

The hardship for therapists of trying to negotiate a safe passage
between the Scylla of unjustified disclosure and the Charybdis of
failure to warn was somewhat mitigated by the court's ruling that
their judgment need not be "perfect," but merely must evince
"that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of [their profession] under
similar circumstance^."^^ While the court did not limit the therapist's obligation to act to cases in which the identity of the victim
was known, it did recognize that a therapist could not be required
to "interrogate" the patient, or to "conduct an independent investigation" in order to discover the victim's identity.?' The case
never actually went to trial, but was settled on terms "within the
range for wrongful death of a college girlwT6on July 1, 1977--one
year to the day after the second Tarasoffopinion.
Id. a t 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
Id. a t 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. a t 25 (citations omitted).
74 Id. a t 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 335 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.11. The California Supreme Court has since made it absolutely clear that a nonspecific threat directed a t the
general population cannot be the predicate for Tarasoff liability, even when it might be
reasonable to expect the therapist to recognize that a patient poses danger to the community a t large. The potential victim of the patient has to be "readily identifiable" in order to
trigger a Tarasoff duty. See Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,754,614 P.2d
728,735,167 Cal. Rptr. 70,76 (1980). See also Hooks v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical
Group, 107 Cal. App. 3d 435,165 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1980) (duty to warn when foreseeable risk
of harm to foreseeable victim exists); Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594,
162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 152-56 infra. The reasoning
in Hooks has also been adopted by a federal district court. See Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F.
Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981), discussed in text accompanying notes 178-81 infra.
76 Personal communication from George Alexander McKray, Esq., counsel for the
Tarasoffs, on June 28, 1979.
7P
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The major difference between the initial opinion and the decision after rehearing is the responsibility placed on the police. In
the second opinion, neither a "duty to warn" nor a duty to take
special steps to protect the victim was imposed on the police, despite their express duty to assure public safety and their freedom
from any obligation to preserve the confidentiality of Poddar's
statements. If a therapist's responsibility in these circumstances
can be met by communicating the perceived danger to law enforcement authorities, as Tarasoffclearly says, why should such authorities-whose power to restrain the liberty of the "dangerous" person exceeds that of any therapist- themselves be exonerated from
liability for failing to warn the victim or prevent the harm?-The
California Supreme Court's only stated reason for upholding the
dismissal of the suit against the police was the absence of a "special relationship," such as that of psychotherapist and patient, between the police and Poddar. The Tarasoffruling centers on this
concept of a "special relationship," and on the posited ability of
therapi~ts'~
to anticipate potential violence in patients. Analogizing the relationship to other "controlling" relationships, the court
suggested that therapists can control their dangerous patients
through the exercise of both their statutory authority to initiate
commitment proceedings and their therapeutic influence.
IV. Tarasoff'sCONSEQUENCES
FOR PSYCHIATRIC
PRACTICE

A. The Limits of Psychiatric Expertise
1. Diagnosing Dangerousness and Predicting Behavior

It has been asserted, reasonably enough, that the Tarasoffcourt
hoist psychiatrists with their own petard. Having failed to correct

" In its discussion of the duty to disclose, the Tarasoff court did not distinguish psychiatrists from other professionals engaged in treating the mentally ill or emotionally disturbed, and used the comprehensive term "psychotherapist*'. Nothing in the Tararsoff opinion or in subsequent decisions limits the applicability of the duty to Board-certified
psychiatrists or even to physicians. See People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 768-69 n.31,
631 P.2d 446,467 n.31, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738,759 n.31 (1981) (judicial notice taken of studies
showing unreliability of psychiatrists' attempts to forecast violence; such studies held likely
to apply to psychologists' forecasts as well). For a discussion of the applicability of Tarasoff
to psychiatric nurses, see Kjervik, The Psychiatric Nurse's Duty to Warn Potential Victims
of Homicidal Psychotherapy Outpatients, 9 L. MED. & HEALTHCARE11 (1981).
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the perception of judges, correctional authorities, legislators, and
the public that they are capable of detecting "dangerousness," and
having acquired in large part the power to determine society's reaction to the "dangerous" individ~al,?~
psychiatrists now arguably
are confronted with the logical implications of that power.
Individual members of the profession, as well as commentators
from other fields, have long concurred that, in the legal arena, psychiatrists are induced to exceed the bounds of their genuine competence and too often allow themselves to render extraordinarily
complex and difficult value judgments in the guise of "scientific"
opinion.78 Jonas Robitscher, for one, devoted a significant portion
of his career to exposing and combatting such malpractice.7s But
on the whole, prior to Tarasoff, this concern had not been embraced, nor had evidence of its potential for abuse been marshalled, by broad-based and representative groups within the profession. It is somewhat ironic that only six months before the
decision in Tarasoff I a prestigious task force of the American Psychiatric Association concluded that "neither psychiatrists nor anyone else have reliably demonstrated an ability to predict future violence or 'dangerousness.' Neither has any special psychiatric
expertise in this area been e~tablished."~~
On the rehearing of Tarasoff I, the attorneys for the American
Psychiatric Association and other professional organizations as
amici curiae cited that report and contended that the imposition
of a duty to take reasonable measures to protect the potential victim of a dangerous patient was unfair, because psychiatrists simply
77 "If a sociologist predicted that a person was 80 percent likely to commit a felonious
act, no law would permit his confinement. On the other hand, if a psychiatrist testified that
a person was mentdy ill and 80 percent Iikely to commit a dangerous act, the patient would
be committed!' Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111: Theories and Procedures, 79
HARV.L. REV.1288, 1290 (1966).
See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 15;Dershowitz, supra note 48; Hdeck, A Critique of
Current Psychiatric Roles in the Legal Process, 1966 WIS. L. REV.379; Suarez, A Critique
SCI. 172 (1967).See generally
of the Psychiatrist's Role as Expert Witness, 12 J. FORENSIC
OF PSYCHIATRY
(1972); T. Swsz, IDEOLOGY
AND INSANXTY
(1972); T.
B. ENNIS,PRISONERS
SZASZ,
LAW,LIBERTY
AND PSYCHIATRY
(1963).
7D See, e.g., Robitscher, supra note 49.
O0 A.P.A.
TASK
FORCEON CLINICALASPECTSOF THE VIOLENTINDIVIDUAL,
REPORT8:
CLINICAL
ASPECTS
OF THE VIOLENT
INDIVIDUAL
28 (1974).
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cannot accurately foresee violent behavior in their patients, and
was unwise, because of the disastrous impact of such a duty on the
practice of psychotherapy. They brought to the court's attention
numerous articles and studies purporting to demonstrate that, in
the current state of the art, psychiatrists consistently overpredict
violent behavior-that their predictions may well be no more reliable than those arrived a t by the toss of a coin.81
A'storm of criticism from psychiatrists followed in the wake of
the second Tarasoff opinion, echoing the contentions advanced by
the arnicis2 Conceding the low reliability and questionable validity
of psychiatric diagnoses-what detractors have called psychiatric
"labelsyy-some psychiatrists maintain that susceptibility to error
is even more pronounced in their prognoses, and most problematic
of all when their task is the prediction of violent behavior.s3A vioSee, e.g., A. STONE,MENTALHEALTHAND LAW:A SYSTEMIN TRANSITION
33 (1975).
Stone states:
It can easily be stated flatly on the basis of my own review of the published material on the prediction of dangerous acts that neither objective actuarial tables nor
psychiatric intuition, diagnosis, and psychological testing can claim predictive suc:
cess. . . . The mental health professionals . . . simply have no demonstrated capacity to generate even a cutting line that will confine more true than false
positives.
The Prevention of Violence, in CO~~MUNITY
MENTAL
HEALTHAND THE
See ako J. MONAHAN,
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
(1976);Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness,
123 U. PA.L.REV.439 (1974);Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF.L. REV. 693 (1974);Steadman & Keveles,
The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-70,129
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
304 (1972).
See, e.g., Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY
289, 291 (1977);McDonald, The "Warning" Decision-Further Complications,
PSYCHIATRIC
NEWS,Jan. 21, 1977, a t 33; Shah, Dangerousness-A Paradigm for Exploring
224 (1978);Skodol & Karasu,
Some Issues in Law and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
202 (1978).The
Emergency Psychiatry and the Assaultive Patient, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
Tarasoff decision poses an impossible dilemma for clinicians, according to the Recommended Position Statement on the Tarasoff Decision of the American Psychiatric Associntion Committee on Confidentiality, quoted in Beigler, Privacy and Confidentiality, in LAW
AND ETHICSIN THE PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY
a t 69, 82-83(C.K.Hofling ed. 1981).
83 "Psychiatrists can predict dangerousness about as well as h e corner butcher." Statement of Dr. Stanley Portnow, Associate Professor, N.Y.U. Medical School, N.Y. Times, Dec.
16,1979,a t E7; "Psychiatrists don't have the capacity to predict dangerousness. Every empirical study demonstrates that they cannot. Just because the legal system says you can,
doesn't make i t so." Statement of Dr. Alan Stone, President of the American Psychiatric
Association (1979-80)and Professor, Harvard Law School, in Saxbe, Must Psychotherapists
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lent assault on another person is a peculiarly difficult phenomenon
to predict accurately, because it is such a comparatively rare event.
The prediction of violence, like that of many other low base-rate
behaviors, is subject to a substantial risk of resulting in "false positives"-that is, of identifying as "dangerous" many persons who
will never engage in violent conduct.84
-

Psychiatrists quite properly denounce the term "dangerousness"
as a legal construct, not a medical one, and an ill-defined, ambiguous construct a t that.86 Unlike the "infectiousness" of a disease,
"dangerousness" is not an objectively verifiable condition. Nor can
it accurately be considered a personal attribute, or a character
trait. Rather, like other behavioral-science concepts, it is a way of
describing the probable outcome of interaction between a person
and the environment or social situation in which that person functions. To predict violent behavior is to speculate about someone's
future response to a complex of variables, any one of which may or
-

Warn About Released Patients? N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1980, a t C3, co1.2.
The recent highly publicized trial of John W. Hinckley, accused of attempting to assassinate President Reagan, has once again heightened the controversy over the role of mental
health professionals in the legal system. While most of the media attention has focused on
the unexpected verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, and subsequent
calls for reform or abolition of the insanity defense, the validity of psychiatric predictions of
long-term "dangerousness" also has come to the fore in connection with the need to assess
Hinckley's present mental state and eligibiity for release from custody. The general attitude of mental health professionals se%rnsto have undergone radical change since the preTarasoff era. In one news report, the emphatic declaration of leading forensic psychiatrist
Dr. Loren Roth, "Can clinicians say which person will be dangerous in nine months, one
year or five years? No!" is cited as expressing an opinion generally heid in the psychiatric
profession. See Pines, Violence Termed Hard to Foretell: Mental Experts Say Profession is
Not Equipped to Predict How Hinckley May Act, N.Y. Times, June 27,1982, a t 25, col. 1.
" J. MONAHAN,
THECLINICAL
PREDICTIONOF VIOLENT
BEHAVIOR
33 (1981) (citing Meehl
& Rosen, Antecedent Probability and the Efficacy of Psychometric Signs, Patterns or Cutting Scores, 52 PSYCHIATRIC
BULL.194 (1955), and quoting Livermore, Malmquist, & Meehl,
supra note 48, a t 84).
See Brooks, Notes on Defining the "Dangerousness" of the Mentally Ill, in DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR:
A PROBLEM
IN LAWAND MENTAL
HEALTH
a t 37 (C. Frederick ed. 1978); Shah,
Dangerousness, supra note 20, a t 156. For a critique and review of the use of the term in the
context of civil commitment, see Weissbourd, Inuoluntary Commitment: The Moue Toward
Dangerousness, 15 J. MAR.L. REV. 83 (1982) (court. have tried to resolve confiict of legal
and psychiatric concerns by emphasis on largely legal concept of dangerousness). See also
Dershowitz, supra note 48, a t 24.

H e i n o n l i n e - - 3 1 Emory L. J. 299 1 9 8 2

300

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

may not occur.se Although actuarial correlates with violent behavior have been observed:'
there appears to be little agreement
among practitioners, either in terms of theoretical analysis or empirical research, as to what, other than prior acts of violence, constitutes a clinical indicator of "dangerousness." Even an expressed
violent intention, such as that of Prosenjit Poddar, may reflect
only the harmless discharge of repressed emotion, common in the
therapeutic process. There are no courses in medical schools and
psychoanalytic institutes and no definitive texts which explain the
technique and criteria by which an assessment of "dangerousness"
can be made.88 Therefore, psychiatrists argue, there is no "standard of the profession" for determining when a patient "presents a
serious danger of violence to another,"8e and the failure to forestall
or forewarn of such a contingency can never fairly be evaluated by
the hindsight of judge and jury.
The profession's shocked and defensive reaction to this new responsibility was particularly understandable since the very same
California court, during the interim between the two Tarasoff decisions, had decided that the standard of proof required in sex-offender commitment proceedings based on psychiatric recommendation must be "beyond a reasonable doubt," noting:
88 See generally Bem and Funder, Predicting More of the People More of the Time:
REV.485 (1978);Bowers, SituationAssessing the Personality of Situations, 85 PSYCHOLOGY
ism i n Psychology: A n Analysis and Critique, 80 'PSYCHOLOGY
REV. 307 (1973); Cohen,
Groth, & Siegel, T h e Clinical Prediction of Dangerousness, 1978 CRIME& DELINQ.28, 33
(1978); Lewin, Lippett, & White, Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Cre271 (1939). On the importance o f viewing
ated "Social Climates," 10 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
"dangerousness" as a "probabilistic" assessment, the consequences o f which are dictated b y
social policy and political judgment rather than "objective" science, see Monahan & Wexler,
A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 L. & HUM.BEHAV.37
(1978); Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: A n Analysis of the Mental Health
Law, 51 So. CALIF.L. REV. 527, 593-94 (1978).
" See J. MONAHAN,
supra note 84, at 71. For an extraordinarily lucid explanation o f the
distinction between cliiical and actuarial or statistical predictive methods and their relative
benefits and disadvantages, see Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior
with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALEL.J. 1408 (1979).
as See Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERSL. REV. 1084 (1976).
Tarasoff v. Regents o f the Univ. o f Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).
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Perhaps the psychiatrist is an expert at deciding whether a
person is mentally ill, but is he an expert at predicting which
of the persons so diagnosed are dangerous? Sane people too
are dangerous, and it may legitimately be inquired whether
there is anything in the education, training, or experience of
psychiatrists which renders them particularly adept at predicting dangerous behavior. Predictions of dangerous behavior, no matter who makes them, are incredibly inaccurate, and
there is a growing consensus that psychiatrists are not
uniquely qualified to predict dangerous behavior and are, in
fact, less accurate in their predictions than other
professional^.^^

Such an assessment of the validity of psychiatric opinion must indeed come as a revelation to the tens of thousands who are involuntarily hospitalized each year because a psychiatrist has found
them "dangerous," and to the defendants in Texas and Virginia
who have received death sentences predicated on psychiatric testiDr. Lee Coleman, a Califormony of "continuing dangerou~ness."~~
nia psychiatrist whose studies were cited in the A.P.A. amicus
brief, was moved to comment, after the rehearing of Tarasof I had
been granted:
It is hard for me to understand how the psychiatric community can ask to have it both ways-to be free of an obligation
to warn, on the basis of inability to predict dangerousness,
and yet to have the authority to incarcerate patients on the
basis of an ability to predict dangerousnes~.~~

2. The "Draconian Dilemma"

Not only have psychiatrists found Tarasof an opportune reason
to publicize the limits of their expertise, they have also been impelled by the decision to acknowledge the role conflict precipitated
People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 326, 535 P.2d 352, 365, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501
(1975) (quoting Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355, 364-65 n.2 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Shah, supra note 82, at 225-26; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally
Ill Criminals, 27 ARCHIVES
GEN.PSYCHIATRY
397 (1972). See also notes 47-55 supra.
Ayres & Halbrook, Law, Psychotherapy and the Duty to Warn: A Tragic Trilogy?27
BAYLORL. REV.677, 686 (1975).
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by their willingness to serve as agents of social control. As the
Tarasoff dissent observed, therapists are confronted with a "Draconian dilemma."s9 The obligation of confidentiality in a therapeutic relationship is not merely a premise of professional ethicsv4but
a legally enforceable imperative. Although the duty is qualified,D6
its violation may be compensated by damages for breach of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of implied contract, defamaTarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,457, 551 P.2d 334, 358, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 38 (1976).
See, e.g., AMERICAN
MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION,
PRINCIPLES
OF MEDICAL
ETHICS5 9 (1957),
reprinted in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIOETHICS
a t 1751 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978); PRINCIPLES
OF
MEDICAL
ETHICSiv (rev. 1980), reprinted in CURRENT
OP~NIONS
OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL
OF
THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
a t ix (1982); AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION,
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICSWITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY
APPLICABLE
TO PSYCHIATRY
§ 9,
reprinted in 131 An!. J. PSYCHIATRY
1057,1063 (1073); THEHIPPOCRATIC
OATH,reprinted in
STEDMAN'S
MEDICAL
DICTIONARY
647 (23d ed. 1976). The legal right and obligation to withhold disclosure of patient confidences in a judicial setting, manifest in testimonial privilege
statutes which vary from state to state, does not necessarily apply to every type of therapist.
But the professional ethical obligation of physicians to maintain confidentiality is shared by
nurses, psychologists, social workers, and other counselors. See, e.g., AMERICANNURSES'ASSOCIATION, CODEFOR NURSES
WITH INTERPRETIVE STATEWNTS
§ 2 (rev. ed. 1976), reprinted
OF BIOETHICS
a t 1789 (W.T. Reich ed. 1978); AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
ASSOCIATION,
ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES
OF PSYCHOLOGISTS,
Principle 5 (rev. ed. 1981), reprinted in
36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
633,635 (1981); NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
OF SOCIAL
WORKERS,
REVISED
CODEOF ETHICS5 2(H), reprinted in 24 N.A.S.W. NEWS13 (1979). In addition, state regulations often broadly define the professions in which confidentiality is required. See, e.g.,
STATEOF NEWYORK,OFFICIALCOMPILATION
OF CODES,
RULESAND REGULATIONS,
tit. 8, part
29, § 29.I(b)(8)(1977) (defining "unprofessional conduct in the practice of any profession
licensed or certified" to include the "revealing of personally identifiable facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior consent of the patient or client,
except as authorized or required by law").
88 Simonson v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920) (statute that defines betrayal of confidential patient information as unprofessional conduct provides basis for liability for breach, but duty of confidentiality subject to qualification that physician may reveal
information reasonably necessary to prevent outbreak of contagious disease); Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962) (physician has duty not to disclose patient information except to third party with legitimate interest in patient's health; for example, prospective insurer of patient's life); Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct.
1960) (patient held to have waived right to confidentiality when psychiatrist revealed patient's alcoholism to employer as underlying cause of repeated absences; patient had requested "medical certificates" excusing absences); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191,331 P.2d
814 (1958) (psychiatrist may be permitted to reveal patient information for protection of
third party, but must show due diligence in ascertaining truth, relevance, and necessity of
revealing information); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917) (physician held
immune from liability for disclosure of patient confidences when disclosures made during
judicial proceedings).
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tion, and m a l p r a c t i ~ eOffenders
.~~
may also, a t least in principle, be
gB See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, motion for reconsideration denied, 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (court applied Ohio law and held
that cause of action against insurance company may be based on allegation that company
wrongfully induced plaintiffs doctor to disclose confidential patient information); Horne v.
Patton, 291 Ala. 701,287 So. 2d 824 (1973) (in absence of statutory doctor-patient privilege,
public policy imposes on physicians a qualified duty of confidentiality the breach of which
gives rise to a cause of action for damages); MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S. 801; 805 (4th
Dep't 1982) (psychiatrist disclosed information to patient's wife; held, patient could sue in
tort, for breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality, and thus recover greater damages than if
sued on implied contract; but affirmative defense of justification recognized "whenever there
is a danger to the patient, the spouse or another person"); Doe v. Roe, 42 A.D.2d 559, 345
N.Y.S.2d 560 (1st Dep't 1973) (action will lie against psychiatrist for publication of book
detailing patient's lengthy psychoanalysis, even if patient's identity somewhat disguised),
aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d 902, 307 N.E.2d 823, 352 N.YS.2d 626 (1973), cert. granted, 417 U.S. 907
(1974), cert dismissed as improvidently granted, 420 U.S. 307 (1975), permanent injunction
a n d damages awarded, 93 Mic. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977); Schaffer v. Spicer, 215
N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1974) (practitioner of healing arts may be liable in damages to patients
for unauthorized disclosure). See generally Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 1109 (1968 & Supp. 1981).
But see Panko v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1970) (pretrial disclosures
to adversary actionable only if wrongful and resulted in loss of plaintiff-patient's lawsuit);
Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957) (court applied Georgia law and held
that absent statutory privilege, no cause of action for disclosure exists); Hammer v. Polsky,
36 Misc. 2d 482, 233 N.Y.S.2d 110, 112 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1962) (psychiatrist-defendant
testified as to plaintiffs mental health on basis of observations made while treating plaintiffs wife; plaintiffs failure to assert existence of doctor-patient relationship held to defeat
an action for malpractice, assuming without deciding that by statute such testimony was a
breach of professional obligation of confidentiality); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651,
389 S.W.2d 249 (1965) (no cause of action may lie against company physician for disclosure
of patient's records to company attorney because codes of ethics are not enforceable a t law
and no statutory privilege exists).
The argument has also been made t h a t the patient's interest in confidentiality within a
therapeutic relationship is not the creature of changeable statute, but is grounded in a constitutionally protected right of privacy. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (right to privacy in doctor-patient relationship precludes requiring parental or spousal consent to patient's abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(constitutional right of privacy in the doctor-patient relationship recognized); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973) (statute requiring approval of abortion by hospital staff abortion committee and by two licensed physicians other than the patient's physician; held, an unconstitutional infringement of right to private doctor-patient relationship); Jones v. Superior
Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981) (constitutional right to privacy in
doctor-patient relationship not absolute but broader than statutory privilege establishing
doctor-patient confidentiality); I n re "B," 394 A.2d 419 (Pa. 1978) (patient's interest in
preventing disclosure by psychotherapist is constitutionally based, therefore therapist's conviction for refusal to comply with court order to reveal patient's records reversed); Cf. Caesar v. Montanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976) (right to privacy in psychotherapist-patient
relationship is not absolute, narrowly drawn patient-litigant exception to privilege rule is
justified by compelling state interest in ascertainment of truth in court proceedings), cert.
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disciplined by professional organizations.
The psychiatrist faced with deciding whether to reveal a patient's threat to a potential target is in an unenviable position. Frequently, such threats are directed toward family members or significant others,B7and transmitting such a message could destroy or
seriously disrupt a vital relationship. Merely revealing the fact of
the patient's status qua psychiatric patient may in and of itself
irreparably injure reputation, career, and other opportunities and
interests. Should later judicial review determine that the therapist's apprehension was unreasonable or unjustified (according to
the fairly nebulous "standard of the profession," of course) the
therapist will suffer the civil and professional consequences. If the
threat is not disclosed and does materialize, liability under a
Tarasoff theory may attach. Had the California court consciously
been trying to design a double bind, it could hardly have been
more successful.
3. The Exercise of Professional Judgment

What seems most disturbing to the psychiatrists who oppose the
Tarasoff doctrine, however, is not just their potential liability for
wrong choices, but the infringement on their professional discretion to make such choices. In contrast, consider the statutes in a
majority of the states which foster the preservation of confidentiality by creating a physician-patient privilege, limiting even judicial
power to compel disclosure of treatment-related communications
in the absence of the patient's consent.98Although the privilege is
denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977); In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415,467 P.2d 557, 8 Cal. Rptr. 829
(1970) (patient-litigant exception did not violate constitutional right to confidentiality in
psychotherapy).
See A.P.A. T A ~ KFORCEON CLINICAL
ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT
INDIVIDUAL,
supra note
80, a t 7-9.
See, e.g., N.Y. CN. PRAC.LAW§ 4504(a) (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1979) ("Unless the
shall not be alpatient waives the privilege, a person authorized to practice medicine
lowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient in a professional
capacity and which was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity."). The California
privileges with respect to psychiatrist-patient and psychologist-patient relationships are
somewhat more inclusive, and their exceptions more narrowly drawn than the rule with
respect to the physician-patient relationship. See CAL.EVID. CODE$8 1010-1028 (West 1966
& Supp. 1977). In California, privilege statutes explicitly apply not only to licensed psychol-

. ..
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always circumscribed by provisions that allow its breach under certain conditi0ns,9~these only permit disclosure, without requiring
it, and leave to the professional's informed and conscientious judgment when they should be invoked. Mandatory reporting of confidential information traditionally has been confined to situations of
immediate and objectively perceptible peril-typically child abuse,
venereal or other highly contagious diseases, gunshot wounds, and
conditions such as epilepsy, which may affect a patient's ability to
drive safely.
The Tarasoffcourt seemed to view disclosure of Poddar's threats
in the same light. To psychiatrists, this is to ignore a basic distinction between physical and psychiatric therapy: a gunshot wound or
a venereal infection will respond to medication and care whether
or not it is reported, but revelation of the fantasy or wish embodied in a threat may undo whatever has already been accomplished
in the therapeutic relationship. A classic formulation of this point
is found in the oft-cited case of Taylor v. United States:lo0
Many physical ailments might be treated with some degree of
effectiveness by a doctor whom the patient did not trust, but
a psychiatrist must have his patient's confidence or he cannot
help him. . . ."The psychiatric patient confides more utterly
than anyone else in the world. He exposes to the therapist not
only what his words directly express: he lays bare his entire
self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most
patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what
will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condition. . . . It would be too much to expect
them to do if they knew that all they say-and all that the
psychiatrist learns from what they say-may be revealed to
ogists and clinical social workers, but also to school psychologists and to family and marital
counselors. Id. a t 1010.
See, e.g., CAL.EVID. CODE5 1024 (West 1966 & Supp. 1977) ("There is no privilege
under this article if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is
in such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or
property of another and that disclosure of the communication is necessary to prevent the
threatened danger."). For additional cases illustrating circumstances in which the duty of
confidentiality may be qualied, see note 95 supra.
loo 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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the whole world from a witness stand."101

The legislative history of a proposed psychotherapist-patient privilege statute in New York reflects a similar concern:
This blanket privilege is premised on the need to protect confidentiality if patients are to make the communications required in psychotherapy. By contrast, successful treatment of
physical conditions seldom depends on the assurance of confidentiality, so a privilege is extended in such cases only to disclosures which would tend to embarrass, humiliate, or disgrace the patient.lo2

B. Compromised Confidentiality
1. Destruction of Trust

Given the emphasis on complete candor as an essential element
of effective psychotherapy, some writers have proposed that the assurances of confidentiality offered by a therapist a t the commencement of treatment should be coupled with quasi-Miranda warnings
as to their limits, so that the patient's consent to treatment will be
fully informed.los Psychiatrists argue that as patients are so ad-

''' Id. at 401 (quoting M. GU~TMACHER
& H. WEIHOPEN,
PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAW272
(1952)). Taylor had been found incompetent to stand trial and confined to the notorious St.
Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington. When finally returned to stand trial, he raised an insanity plea. The prosecution called a hospital staff psychiatrist who testified that Taylor
had told him he was malingering. Bassd on this breach of a statutory privilege and numerous other errors, the conviction was reversed. ,
PROPOSED
CODEOP EVIDENCE
FOR THE STATEOF NEWYORK5 504 comment, at 78-79
(West 1982). See also PROPOSED
FED. R. EVID.504, 56 F.R.D. 240, 242 advisory committee
note (1972) ("Among physicians, the psychiatrists had a special need to maintain confidentiality . . Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and in
order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks sucOF PSYCHIATRY,
REPORTNO. 46
cessful treatment.") (quoting GROUPFOR THE ADVANCEMENT
a t 92 (1960)). This rule was not enacted, and to date there is no independent federal physician-patient or psychotherapist-patient privilege. For a thorough discussion of the physiFEDERAL
T~STIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES
$5
cian-patient privilege in federal practice, see LARKIN,
3.01-3.04 (1982).
log See Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62
CALIF.L. REV.1025, 1056-60 (1974); Sadoff, Informed Consent, Confidentiality and Privilege in Psychiatry: Practical Applications, 2 BULL.AM. ACAD.PSYCHIATRY
& L. 101, 105
(1974). One commentator has expressed surprise at the prevalence of the uncritical assumption that the therapist must inform the patient that a breach of confidentiality might be

..
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vised, and as the general public becomes aware of these limits,
those perhaps most in need of counselling and restraint will be deterred from seeking treatment a b initio. People who do enter treatment may be reluctant to place complete confidence in their therapists,lO' and such reluctance could aggravate the repression that is
at the heart of their troubles.106Successful psychotherapy is said to
depend on the patient's ability to communicate without reservation, which in turn requires a totally trusting relationship.
One of the major objectives of a therapeutic program is helping
the patient learn how to discharge violent impulses and to develop
socially acceptable behavior instead of acting out. To do this, the
patient first must be able to allow the violent impulses into his or
necessary. See Dix, Tarasoff and the Duty to Warn Potential Victims, in LAWAND ETHICS
IN THE PRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRY
118 (C.K. Hofling ed. 1981).
IMOne study of uncertain validity was cited by Justice Clark, author of the Tarasoff
dissent, to the effect that most people would be less open with a psychiatrist in the absence
of a guarantee of confidentiality. See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer
and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71
YALEL.J. 1226,1255 (1962). See also Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn On Psychiatrists: A
Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric Profession, 48 U. COLO.L. REV.283, 293,308-09 (1977)
(extension of Tarasoff doctrine will inhibit potential patients); California Senate Committee
on Judicial Commentary on CAI..EVID.CODE§ 1014 (Law Revision Commission has received
"several reliable reports that persons in need of treatment sometimes refuse such treatment
from psychiatrists because the confidentiality of their communications cannot be assured")
quoted in Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 508, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 281
(1977). For further discussion of Grosslight, see note 113 infra.
One interesting recent study surveyed a random population sample, including both regular patients and nonpatients of internists, in an effort to determine the role played by
knowledge and attitudes about confidentiality in utilization of health-care services. The
questionnaire responses indicated that a sizable minority of those who rarely visit a doctor
claim to have been deterred from doing so in part by fear that confidential information
would be divulged. About half of those who were regular patients reported significant concern about possible breaches of confidentiality, and roughly 10% of both groups stated that
they had evidence of prior breaches of confidentiality by internists. As the researchers themselves caution, this data is based on stated attitudes, not observed behavior, and major discrepancies between the two are likely. See Lindenthal & Thomas, Consumers. Clinicians
and Confidentiality, 16 Soc. Scr. MED. 333 (1982). Compelling empirical data supporting
the utilitarian justification for confidentiality and privacy in professional relationships have
yet to be assembled.
Io6 "Every person, however well-motivated, has to overcome resistances to therapeutic
exploration. These resistances seek support from every possible source and the possibility of
disclosure would easily be employed in the service of resistance." Goldstein & Katz, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN.B.J.
175, 179 (1962).
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her own consciousness and then be able to reveal them to the therapist.lo6The "duty to warn" could render this objective much more
difficult to achieve. We must not underestimate the potential effect
on the psychiatric patient of disclosing a threat: the patient's willingness to make the threat in the therapist's presence may presage
or follow a critical breakthrough of suppressed anger. The therapist's warning to a third party, if discovered by the patient, may
even trigger the feared violence as the patient "lives up to" the
therapist's expectation^.'^' Or the intended victim, hyperagitated
by the warning, might preemptively strike or protectively overreact
to the patient, precipitating needless tragedy.lo8 At the very least
the therapist's disclosure will seriously undermine the entire therapeutic relationship, perhaps precluding the establishment of any
other relationship of trust:

. .

Confidentiality of communications . sets the stage for an
exchange of thought, word and action at the emotional level.
Without trust there can be no proper transference. In fact,
the essence of much psychotherapy is the learning of trust in
the external world by the formation of a trusting relationship
with the .thefapist. This becomes the model for trust in the
external world and ultimately in the self.lo9

2. Concern about Group Therapy

After the Tarasoff decision, psychiatrists seem to have become
acutely sensitive to questions of confidentiality, speculating about
even such an esoteric issue as the applicability of the Tarasoff rule
in the context of group therapy.l1° Ordinarily, if anyone other than
See Stone, supra note 56, a t 369.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae a t 40, Schneider v. Vine St. Clinic, No. 15344, 111. App.
(4th Dist. 1979). See also Schneider v. Vine St. Clinic, 77 Ill. App. 3d 946, 397 N.E.2d 194
(1979) (appeal of dismissal of complaint dismissed for failure to file timely notice of appeal;
no reference to merits of case by appellate court).
Io8 See Griffith & Griffith, Duty to Third Parties, Dangerousness and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Problematic Concepts for Psychiatrist and Lawyer, 14 Cm. W.L. REV.241,
254 (1978).
lo* D. DAWIDOFF,
THE MALPRACTICE
OF PSYCHIATRISTS
44 (1973). See also R. SLOVENKO
& G. USDIN,supra note 6, a t 41 (1966).
See S. HALLECK,
supra note 8, a t 190. While it is unclear how well Tarasoff is
known, or what is thought about it in the psychiatric community--see discussion in text
accompanying notes 118-29 infra-there are some indications that it has had significant
Io8

'07
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therapist and patient is privy to a communication, its secrecy is no
longer protected by law; the evidentiary privilege is destroyed.
Furthermore, because the therapist-patient or physician-patient
privilege is a creature of statute in derogation of the common law,
it usually is strictly construed.ll1 But most courts and some statutes include within the ambit of privilege those third parties who
are necessary to accomplish the purpose of the treatment: nurses
So it is not clear how the law will
and interpreters, for e~ample."~
define the bounds of confidentiality if the claim is made that the
others present-i.e., therapy group members-are intrinsic to the
treatment process, in some sense members of the treatment team.
No case directly deciding the issue has yet been reported. Still,
some courts that have been asked to extend the privilege to members of a patient's immediate family have done
and the rule
of reason suggests that the privilege ought to be upheld. Confidentiality is just as essential to the therapeutic function in the group
setting as it is in the traditional dyad.l14
impact. See Nugent, Murder Mystery by Psychiatrist Deals With Controuersial ConfidentiPSYCHIATRY
NEWS,Mar. 1982, a t 3-22 ("Because of the Tarasoff case
ality Issue, CLINICAL
the issue of confidentiality is both timely and controversial
.the Tarasoffcase has

...

..

changed the way psychiatry is practiced.")
11' See, e.g., 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
3 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961) (citing Foster v.
Hall, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 89,97 (1831) ("the rule of privilege, having a tendency to prevent
the full disclosure of the truth, ought to be construed strictly"). But see Roberts v. Superior
Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330,337,508 P.2d 309,313,107 Cal. Rptr. 309,313 (1973) (psychotherapistpatient privilege to be liberally construed in favor of patient because of constitutional overtones), and cases cited in note 96 supra.
11' See, e.g., UNIF.R. EVID.Rule 27 (1953); CAL.EVID.CODE
3 1012 (West 1966 & Supp.
1977).
See Grosslight v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. App. 3d 502, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1977)
(tort action against minor and against her parents for failure to control her; vacating order
permitting in camera examination of psychiatric records, including communications of parents with hospital; held, privilege includes all relevant communications of intimate family
members); Yaron v. Yaron, 83 Misc. 2d 276, 372 N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (excluding
from custody proceeding as privileged testimony and records of psychiatrist, social worker,
and counselor jointly consulted by husband and wife); Ellis v. Ellis, 63 Tenn. App. 361,472
S.W.2d 741 (1971) (privilege attaches to communications of patient's intimate family member to psychiatrist). But see In re Humphrey, 79 Misc. 2d 192,359 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Fam. Ct.
1974) (admissions to social worker during joint consultation not privileged); Herrington,
Privilege Denied in Joint Therapy, PSYCHIATRIC
NEWS,May 4, 1979, a t 1,col. 1. (in divorce
proceedings, Virginia judge held unprivileged the disclosures of spouses in joint therapy
with psychiatrist) (case name, court, and citation not given).
Il4 For group therapy patients,

Heinonline - - 3 1 Emory L. J. 309 1982

310

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

Could the therapeutic character of the group, the very quality
that may compel recognition of its confidentiality, also impose on
its members a Tarasoffobligation to disclose threats of violence?
The short answer is that it should not. Group members neither
assert nor are accorded the power to predict one another's future
behavior. Nor can they utilize such predictions to instigate another
member's institutional confinement. That remains the province of
licensed professionals.
3. Changes in Therapeutic Approach

Tarasoff may have aggravated the tendency of some psychiatrists to resort more quickly to commitment of patients, not just
because they fear liability for failure to bring about preventive detention, but because they see commitment as a less destructive alternative, preferable to violating the covenant of confidentiality.l15
To these psychiatrists, revealing a patient's threat to its target,
someone who may be a central figure in the patient's affective life,
seems far more treacherous than an emergency hospitalization.
Some patients might agree. One psychiatric clinic claims to have
experimented successfully with the approach of explaining the
therapist's dilemma and enlisting the patient's aid."= The patient
is asked either to enter a secure facility voluntarily-once an inpatreatment is inexorably linked to completely frank self-disclosure in an environment that accepts their confidences without qualification and holds them inviolate
to outsiders. It would seem that a mutual trust is inherent in the sort of multilateral soul-baring that occurs in group sessions.
If this trust cannot be established, many patients will discontinue therapy and others will be unable to make
worthwhile contributions to the group.
Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group Psychotherapy, re371, 376 (N. Kittrie, H. Hirsh, & G. Wegner
printed in MEDICINE,
LAWAND PUBLICPOLICY
eds. 1975). See also Slovenko, Group Psychotherapy: Privileged Communication and Confidentiality, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 405 (1977); Note, Group Therapy and Privileged Communications, 43 IND.L. J. 93 (1967). A psychologist reports one case in which a member of a
therapy group disclosed statements of another member and the former brought suit for
breach of confidentiality against the group psychologist. The case was dropped in exchange
A GUIDEFOR MENTAL
for the psychologist's forgiving his bill. See R.J. COHEN,MALPRACTICE:
HWTH PROFESSIONALS
147 (1979). (Case #5.71--case name, court, and citation withheld).
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 56, a t 374-75.
See Roth & Meisel, Dangerousness, Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn, 13 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY
508, 509 (1977).

...
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tient, his or her status can more easily be converted from voluntary
to involuntary if necessary-or to give the therapist permission to
contact the victim. The voluntariness of the "consent" in these circumstances is open to question, but a t least the therapist is acknowledging and appealing to that part of the patient's personality
which is responsible and still capable of choice. And the honest
admission of the therapist's conflict and need is a refreshing note,
one that might even enhance rather than detract from the harmony of the therapeutic relationship.
David Wexler, the mental health law specialist, has pointed out
that Tarasoff could have a profoundly salutory effect if it leads
therapists to heed the insights of v i c t i m ~ l o g y A
. ~ now
~ ~ well established subdiscipline of interactionist psychology, victimology holds
that conflict analysis must include the factor of the victim-not
necessarily as an agent provocateur, but as a contributor to the
tension that ignites into violence. Tarasoff will perhaps induce
therapists to expand their frame of reference and to try to involve
in treatment the most likely objects of their primary patient's
homicidal impulses. Such involvement improves the chances of accomplishing substantial change in the patient's life. Tarasoff-conscious therapy, Wexler suggests, may turn out to be more efficacious therapy.

It is fair to ask, however, how relevant the "patient-consent" and
"victim-involvement" responses to the Tarasoff ruling are to the
onerous task of treating patients who have been accused or convicted of criminal violence-a large subpopulation, one would
guess, of the universe of potentially "dangerous" patients. Critics
of the decision contend that therapists' will become more hesitant
than they already are to undertake the treatment of such patients.
Particularly with respect to them, the profession's newly conceded
bias toward the overprediction of violence can only have been reinforced by Tarasoff.
117 See Wexler, The Tarasoff Case and the Controversy over Its Therapeutic ImplicaLAW:MAJORISSUES157, 174-76 (1981).
tions, in &NTAL HEALTH
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C. The Effects of Tarasoff on Role Conflict
Psychiatrists believe that their professional territory has been
invaded by a legal system ill-equipped to oversee the delicate calculation of risk and benefit, both individual and social, involved in
deciding whether to violate a patient's trust. The California Supreme Court concluded that despite "professional inaccuracy in
predicting violence" and "the risk of unnecessary warnings," "the
public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental illness
and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy" was outweighed
by "the public interest in safety from violent assault." "The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."l18 But will the
deleterious impact of Tarasoff on the practice of psychotherapy
promote more violence and greater suffering than it will prevent?
The court dismissed the claim that its ruling would result in a net
At the
increase in "public peril" as "dubious" and "~peculative."~~
time of the Tarasoff decision, neither the psychotherapist amici
nor the court cited any convincing empirical evidence concerning
the degree of harm that a duty to breach confidentiality might entail for private, and, indirectly, public, health and safety.
1. An Empirical Study

In the six years since, only one study of the actual effect of
Tarasoff on the attitudes and practices of the California psychotherapists who have been living with it has been published.120 (Another survey of over a thousand therapists is reportedly in progress.121) Although the results cannot be accepted as definitive,
since they are based on the return of mailed questionnaires from
only a third of a random sample of state licensed psychologists and
members of the California Psychiatric A~sociation,'~~
they do indicate that some change of uncertain magnitude has occurred. Of
Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,442,551 P.2d 334,347, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976).
"* Id. at 440 n.12, 551 P.2d at 346 n.12, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.12.
Ia0 See Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff,31 STAN.L. REV.165 (1978).
la'
See Appelbaum, Tarasoff:An Update on the Duty to Warn, 32 HOSP.& COMMUNITY

PSYCHIATRY
14 (1981).
Iaa

See Note, supra note 120, at 173-74.
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this self-selected and therefore dubiously representative subset of
therapists, all but an insignificant number had heard of the
Tarasoff case, and almost nine in ten reported having discussed
the case with other members of their profe~sion.'~~
One quarter of
them claimed to have noticed increased reluctance to talk about
violence among those patients who had been advised of this potential exception to the rule of confidentiality.12' An equal proportion
reported "losing" a patient who feared the possibility of such a
breach.125 While a small percentage stated that they now feel
tempted to avoid probing into areas related to the subject of violence altogether, many others are spending more clinical time and
attention than before on exploring propensities for violence in
their patients.126
Deficient as its methodology is, the survey nevertheless suggests
that California therapists have revised the criteria by which they
evaluate the seriousness of voiced threats, and that they tend to
give such threats more credence. A substantial number of respondents claim to feel greater anxiety when material related to violence surfaces in the course of treatment, and a similar number
feel increased concern about becoming objects of lawsuits because
of their uncertainty about the parameters of the duty to warn.12'
Almost a fifth of those who responded to the questionnaire believe
that the Tarasoff ruling applies to threats of suicide.128They are
apparently unaware that the one California appellate court confronted with that issue to date declined to so extend the rule.129
Id. at 177 nn.68-69.
Id. a t 177.
a t 177 n.67.
la6 Id. at 181, 182 n.87.
la' Id. a t 181.
Id. a t 178.
See Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 892,141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977), modified on
rehearing, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620-21, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539-40 (1978). Their confusion
may in part be attributable to the publicity generated when a suit was filed on behalf of the
family of comedian Freddie Prinze, who committed suicide after his psychiatrist returned to
him a gun and tranquilizers. See Kirsch & Kasindorf, Is Suicide Ever the Doctor's Fault?
NEWWEST,NOV.21,1977, a t 15. Another determination limiting the scope of Tarasoff duty
was made by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Coles v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1981).
Presented with the claim of a patient against her psychiatrist for negligently failing to prevent her from murdering her husband, the court wasted little time in rejecting the claim.
laS
la'
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2. Advising a Therapist

Of particular interest are the data suggesting an increase in the
practice of consulting an attorney when faced with a Tarasoff
problem. A lawyer may feel no little anxiety about advising a therapist-client on the appropriate course of action in such a case.I3O
Should the lawyer assume that the California precedent will be
found persuasive by the courts of his or her own state? If so, what
particular variation on the theme might they adopt? How certain
is the therapist-client that the patient will act to effectuate the
threat, and how is the lawyer supposed to judge the validity of that
opinion? What if there has been no express threat, but the therapist nevertheless has an uneasy sense that the patient's anger is
ready to erupt into violence?
The Tarasoff double bind would become a paralyzing reality for
the lawyer. If disclosure or preventive detention is recommended,
the client's patient conceivably could join the lawyer as codefendant with the therapist in a suit for breach of confidentiality and
fiduciary duty, or perhaps even for false imprisonment. At least
one suit against a therapist has already been brought by a disgrunIf the lawtled patient whose confidentiality had been vi01ated.l~~
yer counsels instead that the therapist maintain confidentiality
"We have not adopted the rationale in Tarasoff. If we were to do so it would not control the
question here." Id. a t 768. The court held that the Tarasoff duty runs only to intended
third-party victims, not t o the patient.
ls0 That this imagined reaction is not utterly idiosyncratic was corroborated by a talk
with one California lawyer who has been consulted twice in three years by a therapist with a
Tarasoff problem. Interview with Deborah Sanders, Esq. (Nov. 3, 1981). In both instances,
the lawyer found i t difficult to judge the substantiality of the risk, since the patients apparently expressed ambivalence and qualified their destructive urges even as they revealed
them. In each case, the therapist had already tried to have the patient admitted voluntarily
to an institution without success, due to a local shortage of beds. The commitment attempts
compounded the problem, since they could subsequently have been seized upon as proof
that the therapist considered the patient to be extremely dangerous, although the attorney
was well aware that simple decompensation and loss of ego control are also indications for
hospitalization. Both episodes eventually were resolved without injury to anyone, but the
lawyer found them disquieting.
Is' See Appelbaum, supra note 121, a t 15; Sinimons, Issues Raised by Tarasoff Case
PSYCHIATRY
NEWS,Oct. 1981, a t 1. See also
Confusing to Psychiatrists, Courts, CLINICAL
Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980) discussed in text accompanying
notes 165-70 infra; Note, Psychotherapists' Liability for Extrajudicial Breaches of Confidentiality, 18 ARIZ.L. REV. 1061 (1976); cases cited in note 96 supra.
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and the threat subsequently materializes, the patient's victim or
his or her survivors could file suit. While as a general rule thirdparty nonclients cannot sue a lawyer for malpractice, in certain circumstances such actions have been successfully prosecuted.132
There is definitely a trend in some jurisdictions to hold attorneys responsible to third parties who suffer from their negligence,
taking into account the extent to which the transactions involved
were intended to protect or benefit those harmed and the foreseeability of that harm.133 California is one of the more liberal states
k been more resistant to the trend, so
in this regard; New ~ d r has
far.13' Attorneys in several states have been held liable to people
lS1 The leading Supreme Court case on the subject, National Savings Bank v. Ward,
100 U.S. 195 (1879), requires a direct fiduciary relationship between the injured party and
the lawyer sought to be held liable for negligence, except in cases of fraud and collusion, a
breach of duty to the general public, or "imminently dangerous" situations. A Tarasoff situation might well be considered "imminently dangerous!'
lSa See Probert & Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NOTREDAMELAW.708 (1980); Note, Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, 57
N.Y.U.L. REV.126 (1982) (attorneys should be held to standard of due care with regard to
third parties foreseeably injured by their negligence); Note, Attorneys' Liability to Third
Parties for Malpractice: The Growing Acceptance of Liability in the Absence of Priuity, 21
WASHBURN
L.J. 48 (1981) (trend toward rejection of privity requirement, allowing third parties to recover on both tort and contract theories). For a state-by-state summary of authori& V. LEVIT,LEGAL
MALPRACTICE
33 57-59 (1977).
ties, see R. MALLEN
la' See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,364 P.2d 685,15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961) (attorney
could be held liable to would-be beneficiary of testator in absence of privity; but, not negligence to fail to draft will in accord with Rule Against Perpetuities), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
987 (1962); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (public policy balancing
test of foreseeability should replace privity as limit of duty); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App.
3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (third-party creditor could sue lawyer for negligence in
pursuit of collection agency claim). Cf. Victor v. Goldman, 74 Misc. 2d 685, 344 N.Y.S.2d
672 (Sup. Ct. 1973), a r d , 43 A.D.2d 1021,351 N.Y.S.2d 956 (App. Div. 1974) (absent privity
of contract, no liability to putative beneficiary for failure to prepare new will); Maneri v.
Aurodeo, 38 Miic. 2d 190, 238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (attorney not liable to third
party unless fraud, collusion, or malicious or tortious act other than simple negligence). See
also Drago v. Buonagurio, 46 N.Y.2d 778,386 N.E.2d 821,413 N.Y.S.2d 910 (1978), reinstating, 89 Misc. 2d 171,391 N.Y.S.2d 61 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (physician countersuit against attorney for bringing "frivolous" malpractice action; held, attorney not liable to third parties for
negligent performance of obligation to client even if negligence results in damage to third
parties). But see Baer v. Broder, 106 Misc. 2d 929, 935-36,436 N.Y.S.2d 693, 696-97 (Sup.
Ct. 1981) (court permitted executrix who had brought wrongful death action to sue, in her
individual capacity, attorney for negligence, and noted that it was "time to embrace the
California rule . .the citadel of privity is not invulnerable to the assault made upon it in
this case"), aff'd on other grounds, 447 N.Y.S.2d 538 (App. Div. 1982); Singer v. Whitman &

.
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who sustained financial losses from faultily drafted wills, even
though it was the testator-client, not the potential beneficiary, who
had relied on and paid for the attorney's professional judgment.136
Dictum in a leading California case implies that if an attorney improperly advises a client concerning the discharge of an obligation
to one with whom the client has an ongoing fiduciary relationship,
that attorney may be sued by either party.136A Tarasoffcase could
logically be encompassed in that category. The therapist-client obviously has a fiduciary relationship with the patient and, following
Tarasoff,may be considered to owe a special duty to the potential
victim of a patient. Advice to the therapist surely could be construed as intended to protect and benefit both the patient and the
putative victim, as well as the therapist.
In theory a lawyer can no more be penalized for an honest mistake of judgment within the bounds of the "standard of the profession" than can a therapist for a similarly wrong but reasonable
choice. In reality the prospect of an accusation of professional misconduct or incompetence evokes nearly as much fear as an actual
Ransom, 83 A.D.2d 862, 442 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that a New York law
firm owed a duty of care to a nonclient shareholder in a corporation which had retained the
firm); Estate of Douglas, 104 Misc. 2d 430,428 N.Y.S.2d 558 (Surr. Ct. 1980) (although New
York cases continue to require privity, contrary trend may be emerging; applying balancing
test, attorney not liable to trustee and beneficiary with whom not in privity).
See, e.g., Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (Conn. C.P. '1966);
McAbee v. Edwards, 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Shideler v. Dwyer, 386 N.E.
2d 1211 (Ind. App. 1979); Succession of Killingsworth, 292 So. 2d 536 (La. 1974); Guy v.
Liederbach, 280 Pa. Super. 134, 421 A.2d 333 (1980).
IJ%oodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335,556 P.2d 737,134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (holding purchasers of securities from corporate officers who had been incorrectly advised by
their attorney that the stocks could be sold without affecting their tax exemption could not
sue attorney, since plaintiffs were not intended to benefit from attorney's advice to client
and advice was not given to enable corporate officers to discharge obligation to plaintiffs).
See also Roberta v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baenvitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104,111,128 Cal.
Rptr. 901, 906 (1976) (issuance of opinion letter to client, knowing it would be shown to
creditors to induce loan, held negligent because "a legal opinion intended to secure a benefit
for the client, either monetary or otherwise, must be issued with due care, or the attorneye
who do not act carefully will have breached a duty owed to those they attempted or expected to influence on behalf of the client") (emphasis added). Cf. Prescott v. Coppage, 266
Md. 562, 296 A.2d 150 (1972) (attorney liable to preferred creditor for loss suffered from
incorrect distribution of assets by attorney's client, receivor of debtor); United Leasing
Corp. v. Miller, 45 N.C. App. 400,263 S.E.2d 313 (1980) (holding lessor could sue lawyer for
failure to discover lien on property used by clients as collateral for lease).
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imposition of liability. The time and energy consumed by involvement in litigation; the pressure often exerted by a malpractice insurer to settle quickly, regardless of fault, in order to avoid an expensive trial defense; the publicity attendant on the institution of
the suit, whatever the outcome-all combine to eliminate the solConsidering the risk of misjudgace of any ultimate ~indicati0n.l~~
ment and the complexity of the law in this area, lawyers might be
wise to take refuge in asserting sheer lack of ability to give proper
advice-acknowledging
the limits of their expertise, as it
were-and to simply refuse to discuss a Tarasoffproblem with any
therapist who tries to consult them.13s More timid souls can only
salute the intrepid attorneys who have contracted with the American Psychiatric Association to offer a prepaid legal consultation
program to its members, who now can call a toll-free phone number for unlimited advice on "all aspects o f . . practice" including
"~onfidentiality."~
NO doubt everyone is well-insured.

.

V. THEEVOLUTION
OF THE TarasoffDoctrine

A. Two Subsequent Cases
1. No Explicit Threat Admitted
The professional insecurity generated by the Tarasoff decision
clearly will not be restricted to California psychotherapists and
their lawyers. The first of what may be called Tarasoff'sprogeny
arrived on June 12, 1979, in the form of McIntosh v. Milano,140 a
New Jersey lower court decision still on appeal. Though the facts
of McIntosh bear startling similarity to those of Tarasoff,there are
lS7

While in a certain karmic sense lawyers have less standing than other professionals

to complain of the distress entailed in defending a malpractice action, our suffering may be
all the more acute because of our familiarity with the process. The ability to foresee from
the outset just how protracted, inconvenient, and unpleasant an experience will be is at best
a mixed blessing.
Is The only other option would seem to be giving conditional advice, coupled with an
agreement that the therapist will indemnify the lawyer should the advice prove faulty. This
approach might well be considered an unethical attempt to limit liability for malpractice,
which is prohibited with regard to clients. See ABA CODE,
supra note 24, DR 6-102 (''A
lawyer shall not attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his client for his
personal malpractice.").
lSs APA Prepaid Legal Consultation Program, PSYCHIATRIC
NEWS,Dec. 18,1981, at 15.
168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
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significant differences. The patient, Lee Morgenstein, was a seventeen-year-old boy who had been in therapy for two years for
problems associated with drug abuse and adolescent adjustment
reaction. JustYpriorto beginning therapy, Morgenstein apparently
had been sexually involved with a young woman, Kimberly McIntosh, who lived next door. The affair, such as it was, had ended,
but the boy continued to suffer from feelings of possessiveness,
jealousy, and hatred for the men who had replaced him in
Kimberly's affections. Morgenstein confided to his psychiatrist, Dr.
Milano, certain "fantasies of magical power and violence,"141 but
never made a direct threat against his eventual victim. However,
he had engaged in some fairly aggressive behavior, including firing
a BB gun at her car, and had once shown the doctor a knife that
he had bought "to scare people away."142
On the critical day, Morgenstein tried to obtain s e ~ o n a lwith
l~~a
stolen prescription blank. When a suspicious pharmacist contacted
the psychiatrist, Dr. Milano instructed him to let the boy go home,
where the doctor tried, but failed, to reach him. By mischance,
Kimberly, who had moved away from her parents' house, returned
to visit them that very evening. Morgenstein convinced her to go
for a walk to a nearby park. There he shot her.
The McIntoshes sued Dr. Milano on a Tarasofftheory, claiming
that he had been negligent in not warning them of the danger
Morgenstein posed to their daughter. The trial court found the
facts of their complaint sufficient to defeat the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment, holding that a therapist (not necessarily a psychiatrist) may be required to take steps to protect a potential victim from a "dangerous" patient. Comparing this duty to
that of a physician who discovers that a patient is contagious, the
court suggested that its ruling was based as much on the general
responsibility of the medical profession to community welfare as
Id. at 476, 403 A.2d at 505.
Id. at 473,403 A.2d at 503.
Second is a brand of barbiturate which depresses the central nervous system and is
used as a sedative, sometimes for chronic insomnia. It is habit-forming and interacts dangerously with other central nervous system depressants like alcohol. The manufacturers caution
against prescribing it in quantity for patients who have a history of emotional disturbance,
suicidal ideation, or substance abuse. PHYSICIANS'
DESKREFERENCE
1092-93 (35th ed. 1981).
la

14'
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on any "special relationship" of therapist and patient.144
In some ways,. this result seems more palatable than that of
Tarasoff. Dr. Milano had been treating the boy for two years and
knew of at least one overt act of aggression that Morgenstein had
directed against his victim. But in terms of foreseeability-the
keynote of the Tarasoff decision-how could anyone have anticipated Kimberly's coincidental return home? Is there any reason
that Dr. Milano should have concluded from the boy's behavior
that day that he was likely to erupt into violence, particularly in
the absence of an explicit threat? Dr. Milano, unlike Poddar's
therapist, had made no effort to have his patient committed. Does
that bespeak negligence, or does it indicate rather that the psychiatrist did not believe the boy to be dangerous?
2. Discovering the Basis for a Tarasoff Suit
Dr. Milano's crucial mistake may have been less in his therapeutic judgment and more in his subsequent attempts to help his patient."& At Morgenstein's criminal trial, Dr. Milano testified in the
boy's defense.146During that testimony, he admitted that when a
patient did seem dangerous, it was his practice to "look into it"
and sometimes to contact a third party close to the patient.14? In
the civil suit, plaintiff used this testimony to good effect, and the
court characterized it as an implicit concession of a Tarasoff
In fact, as the court noted, the civil suit was "based in
large part" on Milano's testimony in Morgenstein's trial.149
Were it not for that testimony, one may wonder whether the
McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 489-90, 403 A.2d 500, 511-12 (1979).
Undoubtedly, another critical error was the state of some of the doctor's reports,
which contained detectable deletions and additions tending to minimize the patient's desire
for revenge and intention to retaliate against his ex-girlfriend. Id. a t 475 n.6,403 A.2d at 504
n.6.
Id. at 471, 403 A.2d a t 502. Morgenstein was convicted of first-degree murder, and
was sentenced to life imprisonment, but the conviction was reversed on appeal due to improper and prejudicial statements by the prosecutor during the trial. At the time of the
McIntosh decision, the Morgenstein case still had not been finally resolved. Id. at 470 n.1,
403 A.2d at 502 n.1.
"'Id. at 489, 403 A.2d a t 511.
us Id.
"* Id. a t 476, 403 A.2d at 505.
14'
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McIntoshes would ever have had a clue that their daughter's killer
had expressed fantasies of violence to his doctor. It strains credulity to believe that a therapist would volunteer such information to
a potential plaint8 who had been injured by a patient. In those
states in which it is privileged, this information would be essentially undiscoverable, unless the patient waived the privilege with
respect to communcations during treatment-presumably a rare
occurrence when such communications include an explicit and subsequently consummated threat. In most states which recognize a
therapist-patient privilege, it can be waived either explicitly, by
the patient's consent or calling the therapist as a witness, or implicitly, by the patient's placing his or her state of mind in issue
(for example, by raising an insanity defense a t a criminal trial).
Once waived for any reason, the privilege no longer obtains.lSOUnless it has been waived, however, the therapist is not merely entitled but legally bound to assert the privilege if a potential plaintiff
tries to depose or interview the therapist.lS1
One intermediate appellate court in California has ruled on a request to produce psychiatric records in the absence of patient con160 See, e.g., People v. Garaux, 34 CaL App. 3d 611,110 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1973) (psychotherapist-patient privilege waived in second case by patient's having called therapist to testify in first case); UNIF.R EVID.27(7) (1953); 8 J.H. WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE
$$ 2389-2390 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
lm
Even when the privilege has been implicitly waived, a doctor is not supposed to
disclose patient confidences without the patient's express authority. See Hammonds v.
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793,805 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (mere waiver of privilege
does not release a doctor from duty of loyalty to patient; should not permit unsupervised
conversation with adversary); Wenninger v. Muesing, 307 Mi.405,240 N.W.2d 333 (1976)
(public policy precludes private interview of opponent's physician); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98
Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (recognizing causes of action against both a doctor who
discloses patient confidences and an insurer who, in the course of investigating a lawsuit,
induces the doctor to do so), afd, 73 kD.2d 589,422 N.Y.S.2d 887 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Alexander v. Knight, 197 P a Super. 79,177 k 2 d 142,146 (1962) ("members of a profession, especially the medical profession, stand in a confidential or fiduciary capacity as to their patients. They owe their patienta more than just medical care for which payment is exacted;
there is a duty of total care; that includes and comprehends a duty to aid the patient in
litigation, to render reports when necessary and to attend court when needed. That further
includes a duty to refuse aflknative assistance to the patient's antagonist in litigation. The
doctor, of course, owes a duty to conscience to speak the truth; he need, however, speak only
at the proper time"). See also Committee on Professional Ethics of Bar Ass'n of Nassau
County, New York, Op. No. 82-2, reprinted in N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1982, at 26 (attorney may
not privately interview adverse party's physician without party's express consent).
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sent or waiver. In Mavroudis v. Superior Court,162the petitioners
sought the records in order to ascertain whether there were
grounds to sue the therapist under a Tarasoff theory. The court
struggled to find some way to bring the requested material within
the definition of California Evidence Code 5 1024,16salthough, as
the court admitted, a literal reading seems to limit that provision
to permitting disclosure when necessary to prevent prospective
harm, not in a court proceeding long after the threatened danger
has been realized. The court devised a somewhat contorted procedure to govern both the instant request and future ones. First, a
judge would review the psychiatric records in camera to determine
if the plaintiffs had been "readily identifiable as victims."164 Only
if that threshold of relevance were reached would the same judge
then decide whether the patient had "posed a serious danger of
violence . . and [whether] disclosure of confidential communications [had been] necessary to prevent that threatened danger."lB6
Although this decision is to be made in accordance with "the standard of the profession," Mavroudis suggests that in some cases a
judge could resolve the issue without the benefit of expert assistance. When a court perceives the need for such assistance, however, it should appoint an independent expert instead of relying on
one retained by a party to the action.166

.

The in camera procedure does not differ greatly from the standard method of resolving privilege claims. But because of the
unique characteristics of a Tarasoff claim, the procedure could
present a distinctive problem in such cases. Finding the patient's
communications to the psychiatrist unprivileged is virtually
equivalent to ruling that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case of tort liability. Under the statute's terms, the court would
have to conclude that the psychiatrist had reasonable cause to believe that the patient's conditions presented a danger requiring
disclosure to thwart. Such a predetermination on the merits can
lo'

lo'

102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980).
CCA Em. CODE3 1024 (West 1966 & Supp. 1977), quoted a t note 99 supra.
Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 605, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724, 733

(1980).
ISO
Ioe

Id.
Id. a t 605, 162 Cal. Rptr. a t 732-33.
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have prejudicial ramifications for a defendant.lU7More significant,
however, is the irreparable harm done when a judge reviews a patient's records only to discover no basis for abrogation of the privilege. Requests to invade the privacy of the therapeutic relationship
with judicial scrutiny must not be granted routinely on a showing
of no more than an assault committed by someone who is or has
been in psychotherapy. Whether the facts of Mavroudis are sufficient to justify such an invasion is arguable. The petitioners in
Mavroudis may have evoked greater sympathy than would the average assault victim fishing for grounds to file a lawsuit, since they
were the patient's parents, whom he had attacked and seriously
wounded with a hammer.

B. An Unanticipated Consequence of the Tarasoff Rule
Legal doctrine and court decisions, like medical interventions,
sometimes have undesirable consequences that were neither intended nor anticipated by those r e s p o n ~ i b l e .For
~ ~ ~instance, a
troubling side effect of the liability that Tarasoffimposes on psychiatrists may be to render them even more reluctant than they
previously were to cooperate in criminal proceedings against a patient accused of assault or murder, for fear of furnishing ammunition for a civil suit. In this connection it is noteworthy that the
defendant-therapists in Tarasofftestified on Poddar's behalf at his
criminal trial, substantiating his defense of diminished capacity.lUD
Although it is not possible from the case reports to ascertain the
temporal relationship between that testimony and the initiation of
the civil suit, one may fairly speculate that the therapists' testimony did not have a pacifying effect on the Tarasoffs.
See generally Note, Discovery of Psychotherapist-Patient
Tarasoff,15 SANDIEGOL. REV.265 (1978).

Communications after

lW
Any examination of the sociological phenomena of "unanticipated consequences"
must start with Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1
AM. SOC.REV. 894 (1936). See generally S. SIEBER,FATALREMEDIES:
THE IRONIES
OP SOCIAL
INTERVENTION
(1981); UNANTICIPATED
CONSEQUENCES
OF SOCIAL
ACTION:VARIATIONS
ON A SOCIOLOGICAL THEME
(R.K. Merton ed. in press).
16@ See People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 759 n.13, 518 P.2d 342, 348 n.13, 111 Cd.
Rptr. 910, 916 11.13 (1974) (both psychiatrists and the psychologist who had participated in
Poddar's therapy testified).
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Since there is no legal obligation to provide information or answer questions, other than under oath in response to a judicially
enforceable summons,1e0 therapists concerned about possible
Tarasoffliability might be well-advised simply to refuse to discuss
with a patient's lawyer anything that transpired in the course of
therapy-even if the erstwhile patient begged them to do so-no
matter what essential element of the defense they might be in a
position to supply. A recalcitrant therapist could of course be summoned to testify before a grand jury, a t a pretrial hearing, or a t
trial. Even in those jurisdictions which recognize it, the psychotherapist or physician-patient privilege may not be applicable in
criminal proceedings.lB1Grand jury testimony, however, ordinarily
remains unavailable to the defense unless and until the witness
testifies a t trial.ls2 The defense lawyer might have a legitimate basis for calling the therapist to the stand, for example, a t a pretrial
hearing on the voluntariness of a statement allegedly made by the
defendant. Or a t trial, the patient could choose to waive the privilege and thus require the doctor to testify. But competent defense
counsel likely would not take such steps without some notion of
what the doctor would say. No lawyer wants to put on the stand a
loo See A. AMSTERDAM,
B. SEGAL,& M. MILLER,TRIAL M~NUAL
FOR THE DEFENSE
OF
CRIMINAL
CASES5 116, a t 1-101 (1978); K. HEGLAND,
TRIAL AND PRACTICESKILLSIN A NUTSHELL 228 (1978) ("witnesses are not legally obligated to talk to you"). Cf. New York County
District Attorney Witness Aid Service Unit, Your Rights as a Witness in a Criminal Proceeding, 113 ("If you choose to speak to anyone other than the ADA concerning a pending
matter, you may answer any questions asked of you or you may decline to answer any questions") (sic) (improperly suggesting that the witness has no choice about speaking to the
ADA). See, e.g., United States v. White, 454 F.2d 435 (7th Ci. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
962 (1972) (witnesses free to decide whether to grant or refuse lawyer a pretestimonial interview) (citing Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185,188 (D.C. Ci. 1966), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 865 (1969), and United States v. Bowens, 318 F.2d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 1963)). Accord
United States v. Mirenda, 443 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 966 (1971).
See akro People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311,406 N.E.2d 771,428 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1980) (absent
specific legislative directive, or a command or request for assistance by law enforcement
officials, citizen has no obligation to volunteer exculpatory information to law enforcement
authorities) and cases cited therein.
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF EVIDENCE
33 103-104 (E. Cleary
See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK,
2d ed. 1972).
IaP See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 3 3500 (1969); FED. R. CRIM.P. 6(e), 16(a)(3) (1966). Material
evidence favorable to the defense should be disclosed prior to trial pursuant to United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), but prosecutors' and defense attorneys' interpretations of "favorable" have been known to d i e r .
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witness whose testimony is an unknown quantity. Particularly in
the delicate area of expert opinion, unpredictable responses from a
noncooperative, though not demonstrably hostile, witness could be
devastating. The elementary maxim, "never ask a question without
knowing what the witness will answer" cannot always be honored,
but it is not departed from lightly. Ideally, a trial lawyer engages in
extensive preparation of witnesses, in accord with a definite strategy and .an overall theory of the case.1e3
True, a psychiatrist's records generally would be obtainable by
subpoena and if explicit enough might embolden the attorney to
seek the live testimony, notwithstanding the fact that many psychiatrists (and other physicians) have become highly circumspect
in what they include in discoverable treatment records. The point
is that a therapist concerned about potential Tarasoff liability is
not going to be a very helpful partner in the development of an
effective defense. It is not hard to imagine a case in which the result could be a miscarriage of justice. This possible consequence of
Tarasoff seems a t least as serious as the one so frequently alluded
to in the literature: the deterrence of therapists from undertaking
the treatment of potentially violent patients. The McIntosh court
disposed of that issue in short order, asking, "If the psychiatrist
claims inability to predict dangerousness or detect a dangerous
leS See, e.g., A. AMSTERDAM,
B. SEGAL,
& M. MILLER,
supra note 160, $5 106-119 at 1-96
OF TRIALTECHNIQUES
$ 1.5 a t 11 (1980); ALIto 1-104 (1978); T. mum, FUNDAMENTALS
ABA C O MON CONTINUING
~
PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION,
CIVILTRIALMANUAL 385-91 (R.
McCullough & J. Underwood 2d ed. 1981); OFFICEOF PROJECTSDEVELOPMENT,
APPELLATE
OF THE SUPREME
COURTOF THE STATEOF NEWYORK,FIRSTDEP'T, CRIMINAL
TRIAL
DIVISION
ADVOCACY
431-33 (4th ed. 1980). See akio Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596 (La. App.
1976) (failure to interview witnesses prior to trial can be construed as negligence and ineptitude in trial preparation and might constitute malpractice if it causes client's loss); People
v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457, 348 N.E.2d 880, 384 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1976) (failure to investigate and
contact witnesses, along with other questionable conduct, held to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel) (unanimous bench); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 245 (1972) (lawyers permitted to interview adverse witnesses, since failure to
investigate facts could be considered a dereliction of duty); ABA STANDING
C O M M ON
I ~
ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE,
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE--THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Standard 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1980) (duty of defense counsel to investigate carefully all available defenses of fact and of law; defense attorney should interview not only
own witnesses but also accessible prosecution witnesses and should try to secure information
& B. MOULTON,
THELAWYERING
PROfrom prosecutor and police). See generally G. BELLOW
CESS 339-407, 676-92 (1978).
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person, how will he make the determination to weed out 'potentially violent patients'?"le4

C. I n Other Jurisdictions
The courts of several other jurisdictions have been asked to impose Tarasoff liability on psychotherapists. In Maryland, a dentist
named Shaw sued a husband-wife psychiatric team who had simultaneously been treating Shaw, his mistress, and her husband (a situation that may have been in the best interactionist-therapy tradition but seems ethically problematic). One night the estranged
husband caught his wife and Shaw in jlagrante delicto and fired
five bullets into him. Shaw survived and had the audacity to file
suit not only against the by-then divorced husband, who eventually
paid him $20,000, but also against the psychiatric team, claiming
that he should have been warned of the husband's "unstable and
violent condition" which presented a "foreseeable and immediate
danger."le6 During discovery it developed that on the day of the
assault the wife had heard from her son, and had relayed to Shaw,
the information that her husband was "acting in a bizarre way"
and carrying a
The trial court granted the defense motion
for summary judgment, concluding that under the circumstances,
the proximate cause of Shaw's injuries was his own assumption of
risk in going to bed nude with the wife of a distraught and armed
man.le7
On appeal, the reviewing court affirmed the result but did not
endorse the lower court's reasoning. It distinguished Shaw's position from that of the Tarasoffs because he had failed to allege in
his complaint that his assailant had ever communicated to the defendant-therapists an intention to kill or injure Shaw. (Considering
that the husband must have been aware that the other two members of this folie h trois were also patients, his reticence is not surprising). Absent that allegation, the court found no cause of acIM
le6
lee
Ie7

McIntOsh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 493, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (1979).
Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 721, 415 A.2d 625, 628 (1980).
Id. at 721, 415 A.2d at 627.
Id. at 722, 415 A.2d at 628.
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tion.les The court then went on, quite gratuitously, to quote the
Hippocratic Oathlee and to declare that had the psychiatric team
revealed to Shaw the husband's vengeful propensities, they would
have violated the state's privilege statute. This construction is
hardly self-evident, since the statute as written appears applicable
only to judicial proceedings, not to private comm~nication.'~~
The
court did not comment on alternative courses of action to disclosure. Whether it intended to signal a covert rejection of the
Tarasoff principle is difficult to determine. Those Maryland psychotherapists who are aware of the court's opinion must find it
frustratingly opaque.
Altogether clear in its holding, although less so in its reasoning,
is the opinion of the federal district court in Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.171 In that case the court was called upon to deduce
whether Nebraska courts would require psychotherapists to "initiate whatever precautions are reasonably necessary to protect potential victims" of their patients.lq2The plaintiffs had claimed that
Veterans Administration therapists were negligent in their treatment of a psychiatic outpatient who took a shotgun on a shooting
spree in a crowded Omaha nightclub, killing plaintiffs' decedent.
Applying Nebraska law in accord with the Federal Tort Claims
the court characterized Tarasoffand McIntosh as providing
a "just and reasoned analysis" of the issues and expressly adopted
their holdings.17' The court was careful to emphasize that the
Tarasoff standard could be met by taking "those precautions
which would be taken by a reasonable therapist under similar
Id. a t 725, 415 A.2d a t 630.
"All that may come to my knowledge in the exercise of my profession
which
ought not to be spread abroad, I will keep secret and never reveal!' Id. a t 725,415 A.2d at
630.
Id. a t 727 n.9, 415 k 2 d a t 630 n.9, (citing MD. CTS. & JUD.PROC.
CODEANN.5 9109(b) (1974) ("Unless otherwise provided, in all judicial, administrative or legislative proceedings, a patient or hi authorized representative has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and
to prevent a witness from disclosing, communications relating to diagnosis or treatment of
the patient's mental or emotional disorder!') (emphasis added).
I7l Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D.
Neb. 1980).
17'
Id.
17= 28 U.S.C. 5 1346(b) (1976 West & Supp. 1980).
17'
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 189 (D.Neb. 1980).
lea

.. .

leg

Heinonline - - 31 Emory L. J. 326 1982

19821

IMPLICATIONS OF TARASOFF

327

On the facts of this case, it is not clear whom the therapists were
expected to warn, or what precautions they could have taken other
than committing their patient. The relevance of Tarasoff and McIntosh is not apparent; plaintiffs' decedent was hardly a "readily
identifiable" potential victim.176 Perhaps the court as a matter of
public policy wished to avoid finding the hospital negligent for failing to commit an outpatient,17?but its decision seems just as likely
to create an incentive for Nebraska therapists to resort to
commitment.
In Leedy v. Hartnett,178 a Pennsylvania federal district court
had to decide what position the courts of that state would take in a
case of first impression. The defendants in this case were also Veterans Administration psychiatrists. Hartnett, a disabled veteran
and alcoholic with a history of violence, had signed himself out of
the hospital where he was a voluntaiy patient and had gone to live
with the plaintiffs, who generously had offered him a home. About
six months later, Hartnett attacked his hosts and gave them an
unprovoked beating. The victims sued the hospital for having
failed to apprise them, not of a threat, but of Hartnett's assaultive
tendencies. Taking an inventive approach to the issue of foreseeability, the plaintiffs contended that the hospital ought to have realized that they comprised a "readily identifiable" target of Hartnett's violence, based on the statistical probability that the more
one was in contact with him, the more likely one was to become his
victim.170 The court assumed that Pennsylvania courts would entertain a Tarasoff theory of liability, but that to keep it within
"workable limits" it could not be extended to cover the facts of a
case such as this.lsOOnly when a particular victim can be identified
in advance is there good reason to impose a duty to warn, held the
Id. at 193.
See Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980);
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 936, 152 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1979).
l7"ee, e.g., Centeno v. New York, 48 A.D.2d 812, 369 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1st Dep't 1975),
aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 932 (1976), quoted at note 61 supra.
l7"10 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
17* Id. at 1130.
lSOId.
'le
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Finally,lS2in an unreported Illinois decision, an intermediate Illinois court refused to follow Tarasoffand upheld the dismissal of
plaintiffs complaint against a clinic, a psychiatrist, and a social
worker for failing to warn their patient's family of his express intention to "kill rich people."183 The court may have been swayed
by the fact that the statutory strictures on professional breaches of
confidentiality which were in effect a t the time plaintiffs decedent
was murdered contained no exceptions for notifying anyone, not
even the patient's family, of suspected danger. (A subsequent enactment has given providers of mental health-care the discretionary power to disclose a "clear, imminent risk of serious physical or
mental injury."1s4) Too, the court may have found the plaintiffs
Id.
For a more recent incident occurring in New York that received a great deal of
publicity, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 12,1980, a t C3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec. 19,1979, at B1, col.
6; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,1979, a t 50, col. 1. The articles include frequent reference to possible
Tarasoff liability, but the situation is not comparable to the Tarasoff case. Adam Berwid, a
"model" patient a t Pilgrim State Psychiatric Hospital, had been judicially committed following threats to kill his ex-wife. He was given a day's furlough on December 6, 1979-the
second anniversary of his divorce-and promptly went to his ex-wife's home and stabbed
her to death. The next day Berwid called the police and ourrendered. Subsequently, the two
psychiatrists associated with the decision to grant furlough were subjected to disciplinary
proceedings by the State Department of Mental Health and threatened by the Nassau
County District Attorney with criminal prosecution, although reportedly the Nassau County
grand jury refused to indict them. See N.Y. Times, June 20, 1980, a t B2, col. 1.
Predictably, the incident led to demands for legislative enactment to require notification
of courts and law enforcement officers whenever "potentially dangerous" patients are furloughed, and in 1980 New York's Criminal Procedure Law was amended to prohibit the
discharge, conditional release, or even transfer to a less secure facility or status, of anyone
found incompetent to stand trial on a criminal charge, without four days' prior notice, not
only to local police and prosecutors, but to "any person who may reasonably be expected to
be the victim" of the committed person. N.Y. CRIM.PROC.
LAW5 730.60(6)(a)(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1981-1982). See also N.Y. CRIM.PROC.
LAW5 730.60 supplementary practice commentaries (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
The Berwid case is not a true Tarasoff situation. Any civil liability predicated on these
facts would not require aflimation or adoption of a Tarasoff duty by New York courts.
Rather, it would derive from the longstanding and accepted principle that one with a custodial relationship to a previously-diagnosed dangerous pernon can be held responsible for acts
of violence committed after that person's negligent release. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. There was obviously no issue of disclosure of a confidentially communicated
threat, since Mrs. Berwid was well aware of her ex-husband's desire to kill her.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Schneider v. Vine St. Clinic, supra note 107, at 2.
I M Id. a t 49-50.
ISl

9

18'
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theory of proximate causation a bit farfetched. The plaintiffs theory presumed that the patient's family and the patient's personal
physician, had they been warned by defendants about the patient's
statement, would have tried to hospitalize the patient; that their
efforts would have been successful, and that the hospitalization
would have prevented the murder.

VI. A TarasoffDUTYFOR OTHERPROFESSIONS
A. A Lawyer's Duty to Disclose
1. The Proposed Model Rule

It may be some consolation to psychiatrists embroiled in the
"no-win" conflict between their traditional role of confidant and
their new role of informant to learn that the legal profession, sua
sponte, is on the verge of placing its members in a similar double
bind. Lawyers, like psychiatrists, have always had the discretion to
reveal a confidential communication in order to avert future harm
to another.lS5The relevant provision of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility permits a lawyer to reveal "the intention of
his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."lS6 This has been interpreted, however, to allow
la'
Unlike many therapists' codes, the MODEL
CODEOF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
is
also explicit in giving lawyers discretion to reveal a confidence in order to avert harm to
themselves: in defense to an accusation of misconduct or malpractice or in order to collect a
fee. ABA Code, supra note 24, DR 4-101(c)(4). See Levine, Self-Interest or Self Defense:
L.
Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5 HOFSTRA
REV.783 (1977). This provision haa been interpreted to allow lawyers to breach confidentiality even when the charge of misconduct comes from a third party, not from the client. See
Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Ci.1974), cert. denied,
MODELRULES,supra note 24, this exception is
419 U.S. 998 (1975). Under the PROPOSED
described as narrowed to "situations where the client's conduct was involved," which does
not seem all that much more narrow. Rule 1.6, Notes: Code Comparison. Arguably, the
Tarasoff doctrine can be viewed as based on anticipating an accusation of misconduct or
malpractice; if lawyers are permitted to disclose client confidences in order to defend themselves, why not in order to forestall such accusations? The circular nature of this reasoning
should be apparent. You could be held responsible for failing to tell, therefore you are entitled to tell to protect yourself, therefore you ought to teli; if you ought to tell and do not,
you can be held responsible.
laa ABA CODE,supra note 24, DR 4-101(c)(3). In addition, DR 7-102(b) appears to
require lawyers to reveal confidential information in order to rectify client fraud, but its
1974 amendment and its construction in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsi-
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violation of a confidence only if "the facts in the attorney's possession indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed."lS7 That standard probably would not b'e met by the client's merely stating an unlawful intention. Most attorneys would
require a more substantive indication of danger to overcome their
reluctance to violate the rule of confidentiality.
The exceptions to that rule have been fiercely debated within
the profession during the major reconstruction of the Code now in
progress. The first Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provided that: A lawyer shall disclose information
about a client to the extent it appears necessary to prevent the
client from committing an act that would result in death or serious
bodily harm to another person, and to the extent required by law
or the Rules of Professional Conduct.lS8
Were that rule or some other quasi-Tarasoff standard of conduct
for lawyers to be adopted by the courts, a host of problems parallel
to those experienced by psychiatrists would emerge. Clearly there
is no "standard of the profession" which even the most experienced attorney can realistically use as a basis to discriminate between the empty threat and the truly ominous one. Clients in various kinds of legal trouble frequently make irrational and
regrettable statements that could be interpreted as threats.
Whatever their other sins, lawyers have never promulgated the notion that they have the ability to detect a predilection for violence
in clients. I, for one, cannot imagine assessing with any degree of
accuracy how genuine a threat is represented when a client mutters
"I oughta take care of that guy" in reference to an opposing party
or witness. I have heard such comments on occasion, and beyond
advising the client that such conduct would be the height of selfdestructive folly as well as a vicious and criminal act, I have done
nothing. (To my knowledge no violence ever ensued). Many of
bility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) have all but eliminated that effect in those states which have
adopted it. See generally Kramer, Client's Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A
Study in Professional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991 (1979).
Ia7 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
lea Discussion Draft, PROPOSED
MODELRULES,supra note 24, Rule 1.7(b) (emphasis
added).
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these clients stood accused, and in the past had been convicted, of
violence and lawlessness. If anything is a reliable indicator of a real
potential for violence, according to our psychiatric colleagues, it is
previous violent behavior. It is troubling to think that my failure
to act may have endangered ag innocent person. Yet I can see no
reliable way to ascertain the difference between the routine and
the deadly remark.

At this point, while recognition of a Tarasoff duty for lawyers
remains an abstract possibility, I can comfortably assert that I
would not sacrifice my clients' interests by reporting statements
that might increase their chances of conviction, for threatening an
accuser could serve as convincing evidence against an accused.
However, fear of civil liability and professional sanction might well
lead some attorneys, particularly those who rarely handle criminal
matters and are unfamiliar with the pattern of casually uttered
threats, to overcome their sense of obligation to their clients and to
disclose those threats, since under present law they have the discretion, although no duty, to do so. They might recall that before
Tarasoff,psychiatrists also had little reason to suspect that their
professional discretion would be converted into actionable duty.
What about a case similar to McIntosh or Shaw in which no explicit threat was made? The language of the originally proposed
Rule of Professional Conduct was not limited to statements by clients, but was framed in terms of "information about" them. Would
it be sufficient justification for disclosure to know that a client is
violently angry at or possessive of an estranged spouse, and
secretly wishes the latter would "die a thousand painful deaths,"
as a client in a matrimonial action once told me? Warning the client's spouse of such suspicion, if it came to the attention of the
court, could cost the client a considerable sum of alimony, not to
mention its effect on a child-custody arrangement. If the lawyer
had misjudged the situation, the client might have an excellent
claim for breach of fiduciary duty or even malpractice.lse
See Citizens State Bank v. Shapiro, 575 S.W.2d 375,386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (dictum that violation of the ABA CODE,supra note 24-attorney revealing to wife confidential
communication of client husband--could constitute basis for malpractice claim). But see the
disclaimer in the Preliminary Statement of the ABA CODE,supra note 24 :"The Code [does
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The widespread consternation in the bar over the Discussion
Draft apparently persuaded the Kutak Commission to beat an orderly retreat. The Final Draft of the Proposed Model Rules defines
the exceptions to the lawyer's obligation of confidentiality as
purely permissive-not mandatory.lBOCandidates for discretionary
disclosure include those criminal or fraudulent acts which "the
lawyer believes . . . likely to result in death or substantial bodily
harm, or substantial injury to another's financial interest or property of another."lB1 Unfortunately, in its comment on the lawyer's
responsibility with respect to this broad category, the Commission
chose to justify its volte-face with reference to that perennial shibboleth, scienter. The Commission explains that lawyers would find
it difficult to "know" whether a client's heinous purpose will be
carried out because the client "may always have a change of
mind."lB2That formulation seems practically to beg for the psychiatrists' retort: How, then, are we supposed to "know" when our
patients are dangerous? Our patients are just as likely as your clients to repent their threats. Instead of this excursion into epistemology and the vagaries of human nature, the Kutak Commission
could have based its position on one simple proposition: lawyers
lack the expertise
to predict
client behavior and, unlike psychiatrists, lawyers have never acted as if they had such expertise.
The Commission also stated that it did not want fear of professional discipline to enter into lawyers' resolution of this "inherently difficult moral dilemma."1Bs What is puzzling about this observation, aside from the not uninteresting question of when
ethical principles might better be invoked, is that the Commission's Comment also appears to contemplate circumstances in
which a lawyer's failure to prevent a client's injury to a nonclient
not] undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct." Cf.
PROPOSED
MODEL
RULES,supra note 24, at 3 ("violation of the Rules should not necessarily
result in civil liability. . . .The Rules . .may have relevance in determining civil liability,
but they should not be uncritically incorporated into that context.").
loo See PROPOSED
MODEL
RULES,supra note 24, Rule 1.6, at 37-38. A proposal at the
August 1982 ABA House of Delegates convention to reinstate the mandatory disclosure requirement was resoundingly defeated. See Taylor, supra note 24.
Is' See PROPOSED
MODEL
RULES,supra note 24, Rule 1.6, at 37-38.
lo2 Id.
IBS Id. at 39.

.
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could be the predicate for tort liability.'s4 It seems improbable that
the lawyer who might be induced to disclose client confidences prematurely or unnecessarily by a threat of disciplinary sanction
would hesitate longer if the only risk involved were exposure to
civil suit. If the Commission's concern is to preserve unhampered
professional discretion, it might better have questioned the legitimacy of imposing quasi-Tarasoff liability on a lawyer instead of
appearing to lend the theory credence.
2.

The Dangerous Defendant

In the only reported decision on a claim against an attorney
comparable to that of the Tarasoffs, a Washington court granted
summary judgment to the defendant.lS6 Curiously, the case involved a psychiatric prediction of "dangerousness." The attorney
was charged with having failed to disclose a t a bail hearing that he
had been told that his client was mentally ill and dangerous. The
sources of this information were a lawyer and a psychiatrist in the
employ of the client's mother, who was trying to bring about her
son's civil commitment. The client, in jail on a marijuana charge,
had told the attorney that he wanted to get out; the attorney proceeded to apply for his release on personal recognizance, an application that was granted. It is not clear why the mother or her
agents did not attend the hearing and, through the prosecutor,
contest the application, since the attorney had made his intentions
plain. The client's mother was informed of his release. Eight days
later, the boy assaulted her and then attempted suicide. He survived, a t the cost of an amputation of both legs. His mother
brought suit both on his and on her own behalf, alleging malpractice based on a violation of ethical responsibility as well as on the
common law duty to warn foreseeable victims.
lM
"When the threatened injury is grave, such as homicide or serious bodily injury, the
lawyer may have an obligation under tort or criminal law to take reasonable preventive
measures." Id. Concern about precisely this issue was expressed by the Special Comm. of
MODEL
RULES
the New York State Bar Ass'n in its report recommending that the PROPOSED
not be adopted. See REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE
TO REVIEW
ABA DRAFTMODEL
RULESOF PROPESSIONAL
CONDUCT
at 15-17 (1981).
le6 See Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitation Sews., 24
338, 602
P.2d 361 (1979).

ash.'^^^.
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In its analysis, the court assumed without deciding that the psychiatric opinion provided to the attorney was not only unprivileged
but also neither a confidence nor a secret within the meaning of
Disciplinary Rule 4-101(a).1e6Technically, the attorney could have
presented that opinion to the court without breaching an obligation of confidentiality; but to an old-school, adversarially trained
lawyer, the very idea seems preposterous. As the court noted: "We
believe that the duty of counsel to be loyal to his client and to
represent zealously his client's interest overrides the nebulous and
unsupported theory that our rules and ethical code mandate disclosure of information which counsel considers detrimental to his
client's stated interest."lS7
After taking this straightforward stance, the court's subsequent
painstaking effort to distinguish Tarasoff is somewhat mystifying.
First, the court said, perhaps not entirely accurately, that in
Tarasoff, the victim had been "wholly unaware of her danger,"lB8
while here the victim knew all about her son's condition. Second,
the Berkeley therapists' information came from their patient; here
the attorney's information was third-hand.lSe If anything, that
would seem to undercut the lawyer's obligation to keep silent, in
terms of confidentiality; in terms of reliability, however, the court
may have had a point. Finally, the court bootstrapped its finding
of no ethical duty by emphasizing that an ethical duty to disclose
could apply only to that which an attorney was "required by law"
Id. a t 364.
Id. a t 365-66 (emphasis added). Whether or not a lawyer is a t all concerned for the
welfare of anyone other than the client, the lawyer who perceives some reason not to accept
a client's statement a t face value for the client's sake experiences considerable conflict. Unlike psychiatrists, lawyers do not usually feel capable of probing the ultimate meaning behind such a statement. T o some extent, lawyers take refuge in this incapacity; it is almost,
in Veblen's phrase, a "trained incapacity," see T. VEBLEN,THE INSTINCTOP WORKMANEHIP
347 (1914), a lack of skill which paradoxically simplifies and streamlines getting the job
done. Increasingly, however, lawyers are paying attention to this dimension of their work.
See, e.g., Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH.L. REV.1078 (1979); ShaEer,
The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE
DAMP,LAW.231 (1979); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision Making: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA.L.
REV. 41 (1979).
IS8
Hawkins v. King County Dep't of Rehabilitation Sews., 24 Wash. App. 338,343-44,
602 P.2d 361, 365 (1979).
loo
Id.
I"

Iw
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to disclose.200Since the court did not recognize a legal duty, a la
Tarasoff,to disclose the psychiatrist's opinion, the theory of liability based on ethical duty could not be sustained on these facts. But
in dictum, the court did suggest that a common law duty to volunteer information to a court considering pretrial release of a client
might exist if the attorney were convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that "the client has formed a firm intention to inflict serious
personal injuries on an unknowing third person."201
The disquieting implication of this suggestion is that a successful defense attorney might in some circumstances be held responsible for a client's future crimes. The judge who grants the bail application is immune;202the prosecutor who fails to argue for or
achieve the defendant's continued incarceration is also privileged
by
Neither of them owes the defendant loyalty or confidentiality; both have an obvious duty to' the public. But the sole
function of the defense lawyer is to try to persuade the court to
free the client. What sense does it make to impose liability on the
defense lawyer and not on the other part?~ipants?~O~
Id. a t 343, 602 P.2d a t 365.
Id.
so' On the extent of judicial immunity, see, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978) (minor sterilized without her consent, based on judicial approval of parents' petition
in ex parte proceeding with no semblance 'of due process; held, judges not civilly liable for
judicial acts, even when acts were in excess of authority, done maliciously, or erroneously)
See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,553-54 (1967) ("few doctrines . .more solidly established a t common law than the immunity of judges from liability . for acts committed
within their judicial jurisdiction").
'OJ See, e.g., Seibel v. Honolulu, 61 Hawaii 253, 602 P.2d 532 (1979), in which the Hawaii Supreme Court took pains to distinguish Tarasoff in affirming a lower court's dismissal
of a suit against a prosecutor for failing to report a serious breach by a convicted violent sex
offender of the terms on which he had been conditionally released. Sce generally Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (review of historical development of common law rule of
prosecutorial immunity and public policy considerations dictate holding state prosecutor
acting within scope of duties absolutely immune from § 1983 suit, even when prosecutor
knowingly used perjured testimony or deliberately withheld exculpatory information).
aM The defense lawyer is hardly devoid of moral guilt when a client commits another
crime. We cannot brag about our acquittals and exult in the heady sensation of "walking
someone out1'-and we do-without also partaking of some responsibility for what follows,
anymore than a prosecutor can wholly disavow the injustice when an innocent person suffers
a false accusation. This immense and complex subject simply cannot be tackled in this paper; all that I can try to point out is the incoherence of attempts to extend legal liability to
lawyers in this situation. Perhaps in an extraordinary case-if a lawyer actively misrepre-

.
..
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3. The Suicidal Client
Since the Hawkins case involved transmission of someone else's
opinion that a client was "dangerous," the court avoided addressing the question of when, if ever, lawyers should be expected to
rely on their own predictions of "dangerousness," an opinion which
nothing in their professional training or experience enables them
to call more than conjecture, an opinion which probably would not
even be admissible in, for example, an involuntary commitment
hearing.206One New York court, in dictum, has suggested that in
extreme circumstances lawyers may be expected to act on such
judgments.20sThe facts of that case were somewhat more emotionally charged for the lawyer than those in Hawkins. At 2 a.m., Albert Fentress called his long-time friend Wallace Schwartz, a lawyer in civil practice, to announce that he had just killed someone
sented to the court that the client had never mentioned harming a particular individual,
when the client had been threatening that person for the duration of the lawyer-client interview-liability might be appropriate. Even then, however, we must keep in mind the intervening causal factors-principally the judge who actually orders release. There is likewise a
profound difference between the court-appointed psychiatrist who recommends release and
the court-appointed attorney who argues for it. One presents an opinion and claims to have
made an objective judgment; the other takes a forthrightly subjective position and presents
whatever reasons can be found to support it. Again, the lawyer speaks for clients, not dispassionately about them. And unlike the psychiatric witness whose testimony in a commitment proceeding is almost always diipositive, see authorities cited in note 47 supra, the
lawyer's impact on the judge's decision is limited because the judge is usually well aware of
the purpose underlying all that the lawyer says. Yet psychiatrists who render such opinions
have been accorded the absolute immunity of judges and prosecutors from liability for an
erroneous expert opinion that results in the release of a "dangerous" individual who subaequently harms another. See Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981) (holding courtappointed psychiatrist absolutely immune) and authorities cited therein. See also Seibel v.
Honolulu, 61 Hawaii 253,602 P.2d 532 (1979) (case, mentioned in note 203 supra, has same
plaintiff and facts as in Seibel v. Kemble, 631 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981)).
But see Esquivel v. Texas, 595 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Among the seventeen grounds urged in this appeal of a capital murder conviction and death sentence was
the admission during the penalty phase of the trial of the opinion of a former district attorney who had prosecuted the defendant for rape some twenty-five years previously. The witness, based on his knowledge of the defendant's prior criminal record, predicted that he
would commit future offenses and pose a continuing threat to society. The appellate court
finding no error, stated that objections to the witness' lack of qualifications for making a
prediction of future violence went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence, and
suggested that an experienced prosecutor might be just as competent to render such an
opinion as a psychiatrist after an average forensic interview. Id. a t 527-28.
People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Dutchess Cty. Ct. 1980).
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and was about to take his own life. Schwartz coped tolerably well,
all things considered, and attempted to obtain for Fentress some
immediate aid and comfort. (Schwartz lived some fifty miles
away). Through a complex chain of phone calls, the police were
alerted and Fentress was taken into custody, along with his victim's body and his gun. Saved from suicide, he would stand trial
for intentional homicide.
The germane issue before the court was whether the attorney's
breach of confidentiality had immunized his client from prosecution, since all the evidence presented to the grand jury that indicted him flowed from that initial breach. The court managed to
avoid this unpalatable result by emphasizing the intervening independent variables, principally a colorable waiver on Fentress'
part.207The court could not, however, take the client's communications out of the privilege entirely. The "future crime" exception
. ~ ~ ~
did not apply; suicide is not a crime in New Y ~ r k Nonetheless,
the court's dissection of the attorney's trilemma culminated in
these observations:
The ethical oath of secrecy must be measured by common
sense. . . .To exalt the oath of silence, in the face of imminent
death, would, under these circumstances, be not only morally
reprehensible, but ethically unsound. As Professor Monroe
Freedman reminds us, "At one extreme, it seems clear that
the lawyer should reveal information necessary to save a life."
[citations omitted] . . . Thus, even if [Fentress] flatly forbade
Schwartz from calling the police, the ethical duty of silence
would be of dubious operability. . . . Had [Schwartz] acted
any differently, he would have blindly and unpardonably converted a valued ethical duty into a caricature, a mockery of
1°'Id. a t 194-96,425 N.Y.S.2d a t 494-96. Despite the fact that Schwartz had "never for
a moment envisioned himself as being Fentress' attorney," id. a t 187, 425 N.Y.S.2d a t 491,
the court concluded that he had been consulted in his professional capacity, and therefore
an attorney-client relationship had been formed. Id. "That Wallace Schwartz was in effect
called upon to serve as psychologist, therapist, counselor, and friend, does not derogate from
his role as lawyer [cit. omit.]." Id. a t 190, 425 N.Y.S.2d a t 492.
lo8 Id. a t 197-98, 425 N.Y.S.2d
a t 497; see also New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Professional Ethics, Op. 486 (1978) (lawyer may take appropriate action to prevent client
suicide, including disclosure of client intentions even though suicide does not fall into the
category of "future crimes").
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justice and life itself.20D

Would the court have declaimed in similar fashion had the lawyer kept his counsel, Fentress gone ahead and shot himself, and
the lawyer been sued for failing to prevent his death? Possibly yes.
The court found the underlying justification for the duty of confidentiality in the protection of client interests, and then asked:
"What interest can there be superior to the client's life itself?"a10
The question sounds uncannily like that of a physician whose patient's refusal of lifesaving treatment has just been upheld as competent by an anti-paternalistic court. In contrast, consider the reasoning of the Bellah court which, following Tarasoff,would not
countenance a psychiatrist's violation of confidentiality unless it
were necessary to prevent harm to others. That court held that a
threat to hurt oneself could not authorize, let alone require, disclosure.211Perhaps the courts are in the process of developing a bilaterally symmetrical division of professional responsibility: lawyers
will be held liable for failing to prevent client suicides, but not
their homicides, while psychiatrists can be sued for patient homicides, but not their suicides.
4. Statistical Risks

There is another category of conflict between third-party interests and patient or client rights which certain lawyers are likely to
experience but most psychiatrists are not. In the world of corporate and commercial practice, attorneys may often find that their
clients' business decisions present an increased risk to the health
and safety of some statistically predictable, though not individually identifiable, set of consumers, employees, or members of the
public. The paradigm of this conflict is (mercifully) a hypothetical
concocted by Judge Ferren of the D.C. Circuit. Known to legalethics buffs as the "~riremeCase," it centers on the Trireme Aluminum Company, which has recently become profitable through its
Pw People v. Fentress, 103 Misc. 2d 179, 197-98, 425 N.Y.S.2d 485,497 (Dutchem Cty.
Ct. 1980). Invoking Monroe Freedman in support of disclosure of client confidences is certainly citing the strongest authority imaginable.
=lo Id.
Bellah v. Greenson, 73 Cal. App. 3d 911, 141 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1977).
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sales of an aircraft alloy. The alloy, despite having passed all the
required safety tests, has a tendency to crack a t high altitudes. Assured of this by the company's chief engineer, speaking for the entire engineering st&, Trireme's counsel informs the company president and board of directors. They disagree with the chief
engineer, insist that there is no problem worth recalling the product, and veto any notion of going public with the news. A month
later, a plane made with the alloy crashes, killing all aboard. It is
not certain that the alloy is to blame. The government investigation begins and counsel is called upon to represent Trireme's interests. The company wants to continue to conceal evidence of defects
in the alloy. Should the lawyer reveal the evidence?
Judge Ferren concluded, after an exhaustive analysis of the current Code of Professional Responsibility and the relevant ABA
opinions, that it was by no means clear that the attorney had the
right, let alone the duty, to disclose.212 According to the original,
broadly worded Proposed Model Rules, disclosure would seem to
be in order; but the final version, which constrains lawyers to reveal only criminal or fraudulent acts likely to result in injury,
might well not support discl0sure.2~~
Can a lawyer predict death or
injury with greater reliability in this context than when an individual client threatens a wife or a witness? If we follow the reasoning
of the Tarasoffline of cases, the fact that the victims in this instance are not "readily identifiable9'-that the client's actions pose,
if anything, a generalized danger to the public-would preclude an
attempt to hold the lawyer responsible if injury did occur.214The
car manufacturer who chooses to economize on safety equipment,
the government official who launches a counter-insurgency operation or revokes a safety regulation, the megafarmer who fattens
stock on diethylstilbestrol-each is probably some lawyer's client
and they all probably discuss their intentions with their lawyers in

"'See Ferren, supra note 24, at 1262, 1264.
%IS See PROPOSED
MODEL
RULES,supra note 24, Rule 1.6(b)(2), Note, Exceptions to
Confidentiality at 47 (when failure to disclose prospective crime or fraud may result in substantial harm, disclosure discretionary; mandatory disclosure "limited to circumstances in
which the lawyer's conduct is inextricably bound to the client's misconduct, for example,
upon a tribunal").
assisting fraud
'I4
See note 74 supra.

...
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advance. A Tarasoff rule for lawyers that did not limit the universe
of potential plaintiffs to identifiable individuals could lead to legal
malpractice premiums that would eclipse the neurosurgeons'.

B. N o "Draconian Dilemma" for Law Enforcement
Ironically, the imposition of a Tarasoff rule has been considered
only with respect to the helping professions whose obligations of
confidentiality it threatens most. The effort to extend Tarasoff to
members of the one profession whose mandate is public protection-law enforcement-has been unsuccessful. The argument that
it is no less reasonable to create an incentive for police officers to
prevent anticipated and avoidable violence than it is to create a
similar incentive for psychotherapists has not prevailed. Unless evidence is proffered that the person injured had justifiably relied on
a specific promise to provide special protection, the police are not
held liable.216
Recently a wrongful death action was brought against an Arizona police officer.216 The man whom he was questioning had explicitly told the officer that he had firearms and, in the officer's
opinion, recorded a t the time, "gave . . . the impression that he
might resort to violence."217 The officer did nothing but fill out a
form and leave. Fifteen minutes later, that man shot and killed
another, whose family subsequently sued. The action was dismissed because: "A police officer in a field situation should not
have to resolve the dilemma of whether to make a preventative
detention which might turn out to be a false arrest, or not to do so
and risk a tort suit for later consequence^."^^^
The Arizona court followed Tarasoff's lead in declaring that the
decisive factor was the lack of a "special relationship" between the
police and either the killer or the decedent--such as a relationship
See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 449-50, 551 P.2d 334,
352-53, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 32-33 (1976). See also Henderson v. Petersburg, 247 So. 2d 23
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Campbell v. State, 259 Ind. 55, 284 N.E.2d 733 (1972) (dictum);
Weiner v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 55 N.Y.2d 175, 448 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1982).
See McGeorge v. Phoenix, 117 Ariz. 272, 572 P.2d 100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
Id. a t 274 n.1, 572 P.2d a t 102 n.1.
s'B Id. a t 277, 572 P.2d a t 105.
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created by a promise of protection to the decedent, or by prior custodial responsibility for the killer.219Adherence to this traditional
rule has somewhat paradoxical effects. It may be true, for example,
that a therapist generally has access to more information about a
patient than a police officer has about a temporary detainee. Yet
the courts seem to say that even a police officer who has been informed by a therapist that someone is dangerous-as
in
Tarasoff-or who actually formed that opinion from personal observation-as in the Arizona case-risks no liability for a failure to
act on that information. On the other hand, a therapist who did
not perceive a patient to be dangerous-as, perhaps, ,in McIntosh-is exposed to the possibility of suit.
This outcome makes little sense unless the Tarasoff duty rests
exclusively on a claimed and recognized ability to predict violent
behavior-an ability the police do not officially assert, although in
some quarters their hunches may be regarded as a t least as reliable
as psychiatric expertise. The term "special relationship," as used
by the Arizona court and in Tarasoff, must be understood to refer
to, in addition to the two classic categories of tort law already
mentioned, a relationship in which one party's power over the
other is derived from that party's supposed talent for predicting
"dangerousness." In the evolution of the limits of the Tarasoff
principle, attorneys, who are quite innocent of such pretension and
devoid of such power, should properly be classified with other officers of the law, not with psychiatrists.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is reason to suspect that the Tarasoff doctrine, as it takes
shape through the common law, will exacerbate psychiatric role
conflict and compromise loyalty to patients while achieving little in
the way of compensatory ojectives. If its application were confined,
as Judge Mosk suggested, to situations in which a psychotherapist
actually had predicted a patient's violence and then failed to
act-avoiding, in the judge's choice phrase, "the wonderland of
clairvoyance"220-it would produce a somewhat more incremental
Id. at 277, 572 P.2d at 105-06.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,452,551 P.2d 334,354,131
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adjustment of the delicate balance of conflicting professional
obligations.
Psychiatrists should remember that all that is expected of them,
in this as in other areas of tort liability, is that they conduct their
practice with due care and in conformity with the standards of
their profession. Some psychiatrists may even find Tarasoffa spur
to more innovative and honest forms of therapy. But the negative
potential-the temptation Tarasoff may pose for psychiatrists to
resolve doubtful situations in favor of self-protection-suggests
how problematic it is to impose professional standards of practice
from outside the profession. As professionals in many fields are
finding to their dismay, failure to resolve their role conflicts and to
grapple with the limits of their expertise eventually invites regulation by outsiders who are less sensitive to the profession's special
problems and less knowledgeable about them. Tarasoffexemplifies
this phenomenon.
This paper opened with the suggestion that further development
of the Tarasoffrule is not necessarily inexorable, and that if psychiatrists were to divest themselves of some of their "powers," particularly of their claimed ability to predict future "dangerousness,"
the rule might be subject to judicial revision or legislative repeal. If
psychiatrists en masse refused to render opinions of "dangerousness" during their testimony in commitment proceedings and a t
death-penalty trials, it is hard to see how the Tarasoff rationale
could survive.221However, this problem cannot be solved wholly
Cal. Rptr. 14, 34 (1976) (Mosk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12' The potential efficacy and the pitfalls of such an approach are both manifest in the
decision in Teasley v. United States, 662 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir. 1980), granting summary judgment in favor of employees of St. Elizabeth's Hospital. The plaintiff was robbed, raped, and
sodomized by a former patient three weeks after his release from the hospital. She claimed
that the hospital had negligently failed to produce evidence a t a civil commitment proceeding which would have established the patient's dangerousness and resulted in his being kept
in the hospital. The record revealed that the clinical psychologist and ward administrator
who testified a t the hearing refused t o say whether the patient was dangerous or not, indicating (in appropriate interactionist fashion) that that would depend upon whether he took
his medication, his home situation, etc. The court found that since there was no basis for a
"prediction to a mathematical certainty" and since the only duty of the expert witness is to
disclose the facts that tend to support or negate the expert opinion, the defendant Hospital
and its agents could not be held liable. Id. a t 791-92. Plaintiff Teasley, of course, may have
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through the unilateral action of psychiatrists. Lawyers and judges
must do their part by learning to challenge psychiatrists who continue to make such claims and by encouraging psychiatrists who
resist the pressure to do so. In trying to clarify the basis for the
imposition of Tarasoff liability on psychiatrists, I hope to have
somewhat advanced that collaborative process.

wished that one of the old-fashioned, danger-predicting doctors of yore had testified at that
hearing. Following a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, the former patient was successfully committed to St. Elizabeth's.
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